FACT: Polling: U.S. public is against Trump tariffs by about 60%-36%.

THE NUMBERS: Negative/positive* views of Trump administration tariffs in recent polls –

	Negative	Positive
CNN/SRS (April 17-24)	55	28
New York Times/Siena (April 21-24)	55	40
NPR/Marist (April 21-23)	58	34
Washington Post/ABC News (April 18-22)	64	34
Fox News (April 18-21)	58	33
NBC News (April 11-20)	61	39
Pew Center (April 7-13)	59	39
Economist/YouGov (May 9-12)	53	30

* Topline averages across all respondents. Polling questions differ slightly: Pew, Fox, NBC, NPR/Marist, and Washington Post/ABC ask whether respondents “approve” or “disapprove” of Mr. Trump’s handling of tariffs. CNN asks whether respondents view the tariff increases as “good policy” or “bad policy,” NYT/Siena whether respondents “support” or “oppose” the tariff increases, and Economist/YouGov about whether tariffs will hurt or help the U.S. economy. 

WHAT THEY MEAN:

The Tariff Act of 1930, nicknamed “Smoot-Hawley” for the Congressional authors Reed Smoot and Willis Hawley, passed in June,  during the second year of the Herbert Hoover presidency.  The oldest living American — Pennsylvanian Naomi Whitehead, planning for her 115th birthday this fall — was then nineteen. A few thousand more Americans aged 105 years and above join her with personal memories of the event. No one else remembers a general U.S. tariff increase —​​ so for the other 337 million Americans, the experience is new.

Ms. Whitehead’s “greatest generation” concluded in the early 1930s that tariff increases had been a bad idea, and their decision guided policy for the next 80 years. What are the other 337 million 21st-century Americans thinking now, as they monitor administration tariff decrees and revisions, assess its various slogans — “new golden age,” “Production Society,” “Liberation Day,” “two dolls are enough for a girl,” “WalMart should eat the tariffs” — and look for local price and employment impacts? A stream of major media April polls provides an interim snapshot as their opinions form:

The polls — CNN/SSRS, Fox News, Washington Post/ABC News, New York Times/Siena, Pew Center, NBC News, NPR/Marist, Economist/YouGov — suggest three areas of broad consensus: high awareness of the tariff increases; an overall negative view of them; and alarm about the cost of living. The “crosstabs” and “internals,” meanwhile, suggest convergence among some groups whose views on trade policy have differed in previous 21st-century polls — college and non-college, urban and rural, high- and low-income — and apparently widening opinion gaps by race and ethnicity, and by political affiliation. A summary:

Consensus 1: Wide Opposition to Tariff Increases. Averaging the polls, about 60% of the public is negative about the Trump administration’s tariff increases, and 36% is positive. Results vary a bit by poll, but not drastically: the Washington Post/ABC’s 64%-33% split is the most negative response, and the New York Times/Siena 55%-40% division least.

Consensus 2: Prices and Cost of Living are a Top Concern. The polls likewise agree on the high priority the public currently places on prices and cost of living. In CNN/SSRS, for example, 58% of respondents cite cost as the “biggest economic problem facing [my] family,” and 9% mention tariffs specifically. NBC News likewise, asking respondents which economic problem they consider most serious, finds 44% citing “inflation and the cost of living,” while “taxes and take-home pay” and “jobs and unemployment” trail behind at 10% and 7%. Economist/YouGov has an additional insight: asking whether tariffs will help or hurt the U.S. economy in general, and then the respondent’s own personal finances, they get a 53%-30% hurt/help judgment for the national economy, and a sharper 53%-16% divide on personal finance. And a different sort of survey, last Friday’s University of Michigan consumer confidence report, shows very high awareness of tariffs and their link to price increases:

“Tariffs were spontaneously mentioned by nearly three-quarters of consumers, up from almost 60% in April; uncertainty over trade policy continues to dominate consumers’ thinking about the economy.”

Narrowing Gap: Education. Earlier 21st-century polling typically found college-educated Americans more “pro-trade” and high-school diploma holders less. The gap remains in these polls, but has narrowed as non-college Americans (especially African Americans and Hispanic) shift toward a more negative view of tariffs. NPR/Marist’s college-educated Americans, for example, disapprove of Trump’s handling of tariffs by 67% to 32%, and their non-college respondents agree by a somewhat smaller 57% to 43%. In CNN/SSRS likewise, college-educated Americans consider the tariffs “bad policy” by 64-23% and non-college by a smaller 50%-30% margin.

Widening Gap: Race and Ethnicity. On the other hand, past polls rarely showed wide racial and ethnic differences on trade (though Hispanic and Asian Americans at times seemed more “pro-trade” than white and African American respondents). In April’s polls, white respondents are somewhat less negative about Trump administration tariffs than other Americans (though majorities still oppose), and African American opinion is intensely critical. Fox News, for example, has white respondents opposing 56%-35%, African Americans 71%-21%, and Hispanics 60%-31%. Washington Post/ABC likewise finds white Americans disapproving 56%-42%, African Americans 86%-13%, and Hispanics 72%-26%. New York Times/Siena is the outlier, with white respondents opposing by only a small 49%-46% plurality, while African Americans oppose by 75%-16%, Hispanics by 61%-28%, and “other” (presumably combining Native American and Asian American opinion) by 61%-31%.

Widening Gap: Political. The partisan divide in these polls, on the other hand, is much wider than before. Previous 21st-century trade polls did usually find Democrats and liberals more “positive” about trade than Republicans and conservatives — i.e., either more likely to support trade liberalizing agreements and WTO rules, or more negative about tariffs and protectionism — but the April polls report much larger gaps. Democrats oppose the Trump administration’s tariffs overwhelmingly and in some polls almost unanimously, while Republicans favor them by somewhat smaller margins. Political independents are much closer to Democrats. A four-poll comparison:

• Washington Post/ABC:  Democrats “disapprove” of Mr. Trump’s tariffs by 96% to 4% and independents by 70%-28%, while Republicans “approve” by a 74% to 25% margin. Also note: 83% of Republicans “approve” of Mr. Trump’s policies overall and 15% “disapprove,” suggesting less enthusiasm for the tariffs than for other administration policies.
• NPR/Marist: Democrats disapprove 90% to 7% and independents 64%-28%; Republicans approve by 73% to 20%.
• Fox News: Democrats disapprove 88%-7%, and independents 73%-19%: Republicans approve 63%-23%.
• CNN/SRS: Democrats consider the tariffs “bad policy” by 90%-3% and independents 58%-18%; Republicans “good policy” by 64%-16%.

So: As to whether this generation of Americans will draw the same conclusions that Ms. Whitehead’s reached in the 1930s, it’s still probably too early to tell. Democrats do seem to have made up their minds, but more general opinion may not set hard until late summer or fall. But as people ponder the first general tariff increase since the Hoover era, and watch its price, employment, and other local impacts, polling does make two things pretty clear: (1) the initial judgment is quite negative, and (2) with the administration’s “new golden age,” “production society,” and “Liberation Day” rhetoric having failed, its ‘window’ to shape opinion may soon close.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

FACT: The U.S. trade deficit has nearly doubled this year.

THE NUMBERS: U.S. trade deficit (goods and services combined) –

Quarter/year	In dollars*	vs. GDP**
First quarter 2025:	$394 billion	4.2%
Fourth quarter 2024:	$250 billion	3.2%
Third quarter 2024:	$236 billion	3.1%
Second quarter 2024:	$223 billion	3.1%
First quarter 2024:	$205 billion	3.1%

 

* Census, May 2025 FT-900 release
** BEA, advance GDP estimate for the first quarter of 2025

WHAT THEY MEAN:

In an exchange with Rep. Brendan Boyle (D-Pa.) at an April House Ways and Means Committee hearing (2:20:43), U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer defines “success” for the Trump administration’s tariff decrees as follows:

“The deficit [i.e. trade balance] needs to go in the right direction. Manufacturing as a share of GDP needs to go in the right direction.” 

Economics and daily life offer lots of reasons to object to this.  “Manufacturing as a share of GDP,” for example, would fall during a factory boom if (say) homebuilding, digital tech firms, and retail sales grew even faster. Likewise, in a recession, the manufacturing share of GDP could rise even if Americans made many fewer cars, dental drills, harvesters, semiconductor chips, etc., so long as housing and finance crashed harder.  Trade balances, meanwhile, can provide insights on the economy, but their relationship to economic trends is often perverse: deficits tend to rise during good years and fall in recessions. And most people likely see a lower cost of living, strong growth, and job opportunities as the main indications of successful policy, whether in trade specifically or economics in general.

But shelving these high-minded arguments for a minute, how do Ambassador Greer’s two indexes look so far?

We don’t yet know about the “manufacturing share of GDP” and won’t for a while. The Bureau of Economic Analysis does these estimates every three months. Their first 2025 “GDP by Industry” release doesn’t come out until June 26th, and it covers January to March; the first data for trends since the April 2 won’t be out until late September. For the trade balance, though, the initial numbers are drifting in, and they’re pretty unappealing.

Trade-balance numbers originate in data on cargo manifests, pipeline computers, air cargo package arrivals, etc. Customs and Border Protection officers dutifully convey them to Census statisticians who collate and analyze the raw data, add in estimates of service flows, and publish the numbers every month.  Their most recent release — last Thursday’s “FT-900”, covering trade flows in March — suggests that the prospect of rising tariff rates, then the February/March tariff decrees, and the prospect of more in April, induced a rapid and massive deficit spike.

This release reports an overall U.S. March ‘trade deficit’ of $140.5 billion (for goods and services combined) — nearly double the $78.7 billion deficit of October 2024, and more than double the $68.5 billion in March 2024.  Some monthly comparisons across “sectors”:

	March 2024	October 2024	March 2025	Change 3/24-3/25
All goods and services trade	-$68.5 billion	-$73.7 billion	-$140.5 billion	+105%
All goods trade	-$93.5 billion	-$98.8 billion	-$163.5 billion	+65%
Manufacturing trade only	-$84.8 billion	-$118.8 billion	-$151.5 billion	+79%
Agricultural trade only	-$3.0 billion	-$2.5 billion	-$4.6 billion	+53%

Alternatively, the broader goods-and-services figures drawn from BEA’s GDP estimates (and still subject to some revision) show quarterly “deficits” in a $200 to $250 billion range last year, or just under 3% of GDP. The first quarter of 2025 brought a sudden escalation to nearly $400 billion, or 4.2% of GDP. This is the highest GDP ratio BEA has found in 17 years, since the pre-crisis autumn of 2008.

The obvious questions: Why is this happening? How much credit do the administration’s tariff decrees get for it?  Is the spike permanent? And if it is, what would the administration then do?   A few thoughts:

1. Why? “Trade balance” is not an independent thing, but an arithmetical calculation: exports minus imports. The January-March deficit spike is entirely because the ‘import’ side of this calculation got a lot bigger while exports stayed about the same.  The likely cause is that over these months, U.S.-based manufacturers, farmers, and construction firms were stockpiling as much metal, tools, fertilizer, paint, wiring, semiconductor chips, and other inputs as they could to save money before tariffs raised their costs, and retailers were doing the same for spring and summer inventory. So in an immediate sense, the Trump administration’s tariff decrees pretty certainly caused the spike.

2. Is it permanent? Census’ next report will likely still show some import-booming, but over the summer, imports will probably drop back. So all else equal, the deficit would be smaller later in the year.  But by then two new factors will probably come into play, one pushing deficits down and the other pushing them up. They are:

(a) A recession would cut trade deficits: If the U.S. is in recession by July, Americans will buy fewer cars, houses, and consumer goods. Factory slowdowns and canceled construction projects will likewise cut imports of industrial goods.  As in past recessions — 1991, 2001, 2008 — trade deficits would then likely drop. The administration might take solace in that, though the public probably wouldn’t.

(b) Deteriorating savings/investment balance will raise them: Meanwhile, though, the Trump administration’s domestic goals, if met, will lead to higher long-term trade deficits.  The fundamental nature of trade balances is not ‘the incremental results of trade policy here and abroad’, in which balances by country are separate and unconnected data points.  Rather, the trade balance is a core GDP ‘identity’: whether surplus or deficit, it will always equal any gap between national savings and national investment.  If Congress’ potential tax cut is larger than the administration’s tariff increases, government “dissaving” — i.e. the fiscal deficit — will rise. Unless this is offset by some unexpected surge in family savings, or a collapse in business investment, the trade deficit will then grow rather than shrink. This is exactly what happened after the first Trump term’s combination of tariffs on steel, aluminum, and most Chinese-made goods with an income tax cut.

3. And so? The early data look awkward for the trade-balance measurement of success the administration’s senior officials favor. This is probably temporary, but the mix of tariffs and tax policy makes higher long-term deficits more likely than smaller ones. As to the “manufacturing share of GDP,” no particular reason for optimism there either.  Since the first Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese goods, steel, and aluminum in 2018, this share has fallen from 10.9% to 9.9% — either regardless of the tariffs, or in part because of them, given that they raised U.S. manufacturing costs. More of this is probably coming, given the Commerce Department’s apparent plans to make factory managers pay 25% more for basic manufacturing inputs including metals, semiconductor chips, and critical minerals, and the April 2 decree’s 10% tariffs on raw materials, wiring, paint, glass, light-bulbs, ceramics, etc. So there’s a high chance that the administration’s policy will drive both of its chosen “success” indicators — as well as better indicators such as the cost of living — in the “wrong” direction, not the “right” one. What does it then do?

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

Ambassador Greer at the hearing, with prepared text and full video. An exchange with Rep. Boyle on “success” as defined by trade balance and manufacturing GDP share at 2:20:43.

Data:

Census’ most recent monthly FT-900 trade release, with exports, imports, and balances generally, by product type, and by country.

… the FT-900 archives back to 1991.
… and a one-page summary of U.S. imports, exports, and trade balances from 1960 to 2024.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ data on quarterly and annual GDP estimates, along with its GDP by Industry calculations, services trade, investment flows, and more.

Farm trade figures from USDA’s Global Agricultural Trade System.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

FACT: The 1890s were not America’s “wealthiest” age.

THE NUMBERS:  U.S. share of world GDP, PPP basis*  –

2024	15%
2016	16%
1950	27%
1913	19%
1890s avg.	~15%?
1870	9%
1820	2%

* Angus Maddison calculations for 1820-1950; IMF World Economic Outlook April 2025 for 2016 and 2024.

WHAT THEY MEAN:

The Trump administration’s binge of tariff decrees, proclamations, and amendments leaves the U.S. with a tariff rate hard to calculate since it changes every week, but likely somewhere between 15% and 25%. Internationally, this is a strange tax-and-trade neighborhood for America; the neighbors are a sketchy assortment of least-developed countries, failed states, shady tax havens, small islands, and rogue states. (See below for some examples.) But the administration and Mr. Trump personally justify high tariffs not by alluding to the success of modern high-tariff countries, but by looking a long way back through the American past. To cite an eccentric and frequently repeated comment:

“In the 1890s our country was probably the wealthiest it ever was because it was a system of tariffs.”

What to make of this?

It’s true that America had high tariff rates in the 1890s. The U.S. International Trade Commission’s table of tariff rates back to 1891 shows a “trade-weighted average” tariff averaging 27.9% from 1891 to 1900, over ten times the 2.4% of 2023.  It’s wrong, though, to say American wealth peaked relative to other countries, let alone in absolute terms, at that time.  Based on the research of Angus Maddison et al., the U.S.’ share of ‘global GDP’ in the 1890s was probably around 15%. This is a lot higher than it had been before the Civil War (which was also a high-tariff period), but well below the levels of the 1950s and 1960s (after 30 years of steadily falling tariffs), and about the same as it is today.

More important, Americans at the time didn’t feel rich at all. A four-part stat snapshot:

Short lives: America’s average life expectancy at birth in 1900 (Table 13) was 47. This is six years below today’s lowest in the world, the 53 years the World Bank reports for Chad and Lesotho. The short life expectancy in part reflects the extremely high pre-20th century infant mortality rate — more than one in ten American children died before the first birthday — but also frequent death in early life and middle age due to accidents, infections, and contagious diseases. No vaccines, no blood transfusion, no antibiotics, no anti-inflammatory drugs.

Injustice: Work and daily life in 1890s America were deeply unjust and growing rapidly worse. Between 1890 and 1895, 16 states adopted segregationist constitutions and laws covering employment, marriage, voting, education, railroad and streetcar travel, and other matters.  The Supreme Court’s 1896 “Plessy v. Ferguson” decision accepted them all.

Bad economy: GDP accounting and data collection started in the early 1930s, so we don’t precisely know 19th-century growth rates.* (One reputable economic-history project guesses around 3.0% over the 1880s and 1890s.This is slightly below the 3.5% average over the Biden administration, and a bit above the 2.5% average since the 2008/2009 financial crisis.) The decade’s main economic event, though, was the four-year Depression following the “Panic of 1893.” It introduced the word “unemployment” to common American discourse, and prompted the first mass protest march in U.S. history, when “Coxey’s Army” of 6,000 desperate Ohio and Pennsylvania workers marched to the National Mall to appeal (unsuccessfully) for federal relief.  Those who had jobs, meanwhile, worked on average for 2980 hours a year – 1200 hours more than modern-day workers, meaning 10 hours a day, six days a week, with no holidays.

Widespread poverty: Americans were poor and used most of their income for life necessities.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ “100 Years of Consumer Spending” reports that in 1900, the average American family spent 58% of its income on food and clothes.  Today the comparable share is 12%.  Even the top end of “Gilded Age” society had only 8,000 automobile owners and 600,000 mostly communal telephones, in a country of 76 million.

As to the role of tariffs in all this: Gilded Age tariff system defenders argued that high tariffs protected Americans from “low-wage” European and Asian competition. Critics said it mainly protected monopolies, while encouraging political corruption and depressing middle-class living standards.  Public opinion polls weren’t invented until the 1930s, so we don’t really know how the public in general felt. But opposition to high-tariff policy in the 1890s and 1900s was strong, organized, and persistent enough to convince 42 state legislatures to pass an amendment to the Constitution in 1913 authorizing the creation of the income tax, which replaced the tariff as the main federal revenue source.

So, not an era of wealth and not a tax policy the public loved.  Nor a time anyone should want to revisit.

 

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

Laura Duffy for PPI on why tariffs are a bad form of taxation: can’t raise enough money to support a modern government; non-transparent; inequitable; harm to downstream industries.

Back then: 

Two book recs for those wanting a deep dive into Gilded Age tariff debates:

Pioneer journalist Ida Tarbell’s contemporary take in The Tariff in Our Times (1915) associates high-tariff policy more with monopolies, high prices, and corruption than with “wealth”. Samples: “extortion and brigandage”, “jobbery”, “shameless looting”, etc.

Doug Irwin’s magisterial Clashing Over Commerce (2017) reviews U.S. trade and tariff history from the 18th century forward: the First Congress, the “Tariff of Abominations” and the nullification crisis, McKinley and Hoover, Wilson’s replacement of tariffs with the income tax and Roosevelt’s Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 20th-century liberal internationalism and its critics, the first Trump administration and the equivocal Biden term.

Big picture:

Via the OECD, Angus Maddison’s data on world GDP, growth, population, etc., 1-2,000.

And economic-history consortium “Measuring Worth” tries to calculate growth, inflation, and other data back to the 18th century.

Now:

A tariff rate between 15% and 25% puts Americans in the world’s highest tariff bracket.  Per the World Bank’s “weighted-mean” calculations, only three jurisdictions have tariff rates above 20%, and 21 have rates between 12% and 21%. They’re very diverse — small islands, tax havens, least-developed countries, conflicted or failed states, a few bad actors — but share a common theme of inability, as being too small, too poor, or too disorderly, to operate broader-based, fairer taxes on incomes or consumption. The top three are Bermuda at 29.5%, the Solomon Islands at 20.7%, and the Cayman Islands at 20.4%.  Here are ten of the 21 between 12% and 20%:

18.2%        Congo (Republic)
17.6%        Djibouti
16.8%        Chad
16.3%        Bahamas
14.7%        Nauru
14.6%        Barbados
14.5%        Central African Republic
12.7%        Ethiopia
12.6%        Venezuela
12.1%        Iran

For an alternative source, the WTO’s Tariff Profiles 2024 gets somewhat different numbers because it uses ‘simple averages’ and ‘trade-weighted averages’ rather than ‘weighted means’, and doesn’t cover all the small islands. But the picture is pretty similar.

And last:

A mordant sound-track for the next few months from folk legend Pete Seeger: Big Muddy.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

FACT: Alarm clocks, baby strollers, battery-powered sex toys, and thermos bottles may vanish from American stores by the end of May.

THE NUMBERS:  Year-on-year drop in container arrivals at Port of Los Angeles – 

 

May 2024 / May 2025*	-33.0%
February 2008 / February 2009	-32.6%
March 2019 / March 2020	-30.9%

* Comparing scheduled container cargo arrivals for April 27 to May 17, 2025, with actual cargo arrivals in May 2024.

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Here’s the Treasury Secretary Mr. Bessent in March, advocating higher tariffs and lecturing his audience: “Cheap goods are not the essence of the American dream.”

Since then the Trump administration has released a turbid stream of extra-Constitutional “emergency” and “national security” decrees raising tariff rates, mixed with amendments to these decrees to raise rates higher, exempt some goods, or change policy for particular countries. They are complex and frequently change (as with yesterday’s complicated rewrite of the March auto decree). But taken together, and as of this week, they basically leave a tariff rate of 10% for almost all goods (with exceptions for many Canadian and Mexican products and energy), plus the 1.4% average for the permanent, Congressionally authorized tariff system, and 145% on most Chinese-made goods (with exceptions for smartphones and some other IT goods). One result of all these sudden new costs: per press reports, a group of retail CEOs informed the administration a week ago that Americans may start seeing “empty shelves” as early as mid-May. In more specific terms, as the prices of many foods, most clothing and shoes, back-to-school goods, and much else rise, a swathe of cheap and popular mid-range home goods — blenders and alarm clocks, umbrellas and strollers, sex toys and toasters — might vanish altogether.

Here’s why:

A 10% tariff means higher prices, but (as we noted in the case of toasters last summer) probably won’t much change production or trade patterns. The 145% tariff on Chinese goods, by contrast, will often act more like an embargo. A striking New York Times visualization last Sunday (subs. req.), built around the image of a house, suggests the likely impact by reporting the Chinese share of American imports for dozens of home goods: 10% or lower for rugs, mattresses, TVs, and cars; 20%-50% for metal shelves, refrigerators, washers and driers; 90% and above for thermos bottles, microwave ovens, and umbrellas; a 99% peak for alarm clocks and, well, toasters.

Official data on the real-world impacts of all these decrees — trade flows, prices, employment, growth — will flow in slowly over May and June. Some early clues, though, come from the “Port Optimizer” system run by the Port of Los Angeles, which offers near-future forecasts of container-ship arrivals. It predicts 17 ships carrying 83,351 containers* this week, 14 ships carrying 71,520 containers next week, and (a bit more optimistically) 18 carrying 89,917 containers the week after that. Compared to May of 2024, this suggests container arrivals have dropped by 30% to 35%. This would rival or possibly exceed the 32.6% year-on-year fall in February 2009 (after the 2008 financial crisis) and the 30.9% drop in March 2020 as the U.S. economy closed during the COVID-19 pandemic as the steepest decline of the 21st century.

The Port’s cargo figures also hint at where this drop is fastest. It handled $112 billion worth of incoming imports from China last year — a third of its $333 billion in total cargo traffic, and about a quarter of the $439 billion in all U.S. goods imports from China. With the 10% global tariff likely to raise prices and reduce but not end trade, and the 145% tariffs on most Chinese goods after the April 2 decree making many goods prohibitively expensive, the Port Optimizer’s vessel-arrival forecasts — which mirror press reports on plummeting April ship departures from China — likely show a steep plunge in arrivals of Chinese-made home goods.

What would this mean in practice? Overall, China’s share of U.S. goods imports last year was a large but not overwhelming 13%. (In dollars, $439 billion of $3.295 trillion.) As the Times visualization shows, though, China’s share imports is highest in consumer goods, and for some small home appliances exceeds 90%. A quick twelve-product table, with some products used in the Times piece (though using “quantity” rather than “value” shares) and others from our own files:

Product	Value	Quantity (total)	Quantity (China)	Chinese Share	Alternative sources
Alarm clocks	$50 million	11.49 million	11.43 million	99%	Taiwan
Battery-powered sex toys	$450 million	45.0 million	43.6 million	97%	Korea, Germany
Baby strollers	$392 million	5.68 million	5.45 million	96%	Vietnam
Microwave ovens	$1.40 billion	19.7 million	18.5 million	95%	Malaysia, Thailand
Hair dryers	$406 million	23.8 million	20.9 million	88%	Cambodia
Clarinets	$35 million	96,200	66,200	67%	Indonesia
Blenders & juicers	$744 million	45.0 million	38.4 million	85%	Mexico
Toothbrushes	$289 million	1.24 billion	755 million	61%	Germany, Vietnam
Hammers	$111 million	21.15 million	10.30 million	49%	Mexico
Ball-point pens	$481 million	2.75 billion	1.28 billion	47%	Japan, Mexico
Vacuum cleaners	$2.98 billion	63.6 million	22.2 million	35%	Vietnam
Razors	$482 million	1.47 billion	210 million	14%	Mexico, Greece

 

These are just the sort of “cheap goods” Mr. Bessent dismissed in March: kitchen gadgets, low-priced clocks, baby goods, personal care products and simple tools, musical instruments, and so forth. The razors, vacuum cleaners, hammers, and pens at the bottom of the table will likely cost more in the coming weeks and months but stay on the shelves. The clocks, sex toys, strollers, and microwaves near the top, though, might not be available at any price.

So: Nationwide, Americans will be deciding over the next months whether Bessent is right. More personally and locally, if you’re looking to restock your kitchen, bathroom, bedroom, workbench, home office, etc. with small but useful things this year, do it now.

* Technically 83,351 “TEU”.  The TEU, standing for “twenty-foot equivalent unit” is the standard measurement of container traffic. One TEU is one 20’ x 21’ x 8.5’ container, and a 40-foot container counts as two TEU.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

Data:

The New York Times illustrates the Chinese place in American home goods.

The Port of Los Angeles’ container statistics, with monthly totals in TEUs since 1995 and annual totals since 1989.

… the Port Optimizer tracks week-by-week vessel and cargo arrivals.

… the Port’s “Facts and Figures” page.

And the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Dataweb.

From the administration: 

Bessent dismisses affordable goods in March.

… and last week, National Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett says no chance of empty shelves, everything is under control.

Public reaction so far:

Public opinion probably won’t set hard until Americans get a few months’ experience of the tariffs’ real-world effects. The interim judgment, though, is bleak.  Just as the Port Optimizer gives before-the-facts hints at actual cargo arrivals, data from seven major poll releases this past week — Pew, Fox News, Washington Post/ABC News, New York Times/Siena, CNN/SSRS, NPR/Marist, and Harvard’s Institute of Politics (of Americans under 30) — provides a snapshot of attitudes after the April 2 decree but before the real-life impact. We’ll look in more detail in a later Trade Fact, but the average across all six media polls has 60% of Americans “disapproving” of tariff increases while 36% “approve.” Among the individual polls, “disapproval” rates range from 55% to 65%, and “approval” from 33% to 40%.

And for HTS enthusiasts:

For Dataweb users, Harmonized Tariff Schedule codes for the 12 products in the table are:

82052000 for hammers;
821210 and 821220 for razors;
850811, 850819, and 850860 for vacuum cleaners;
8509400015 and 8509400030 for blenders and juicers;
851650 for microwave ovens;
851631 for hair dryers,
87150000 for strollers;
9019102020 and 9010102030 for battery-powered sex toys. We haven’t included non-battery options, not because of prudishness but because HTS does not give them their own lines, instead discreetly concealing them in general “other goods” lines in Chapters 39 and 40.
91051100 and 91051900 for alarm clocks;
9205904020 for clarinets;
96032100 for toothbrushes;
96082000 for ball-point pens.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

FACT: Senate to vote next week on ‘terminating’ Trump tariffs.

THE NUMBERS:  IMF World Economic Outlook forecast changes from January 2025 to April 2025 –

World growth projection	-0.5% lower
U.S. growth projection	-0.9% lower
World inflation projection	0.4% higher
U.S. inflation projection	1.0% higher

WHAT THEY MEAN:

As the Senate prepares to vote next week on a resolution from Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Finance Committee Ranking Member) and Rand Paul (R-Ky.) terminating the Trump administration’s April 2 tariff decree, here’s a sad Friday bulletin from Pennsylvania’s Lehigh Valley News:

“Mack Trucks will lay off 250 to 350 workers at its Macungie-area facility, the company confirmed Friday. The job reductions will occur over the next three months in part because of market uncertainty and the impact of tariffs, the truck maker said in a prepared statement. ‘Heavy-duty truck orders continue to be negatively affected by market uncertainty about freight rates and demand, possible regulatory changes, and the impact of tariffs,’ company spokeswoman Kimberly Pupillo said.”

Pulling back for a broader view, the International Monetary Fund’s new World Economic Outlook — out yesterday morning — drops the Fund’s January optimism about a “growing and normalizing” global economy for a year of uncertainty, slowed growth, and rising inflation. Samples:

“In the United States, consumer, business, and investor sentiment was optimistic at the beginning of the year but has recently shifted to a notably more pessimistic stance as uncertainty has taken hold and new tariffs have been announced. In labor markets, hiring has slowed in many countries, and layoffs have risen. Meanwhile, progress on disinflation has mostly stalled, and inflation has edged upward in some cases.”
…
“[G]lobal growth is … lower than the projections in the January 2025 WEO Update, by 0.5 percentage points.  … U.S. growth is projected to decrease in 2025 to 1.8 percent, 1 percentage point lower than the rate for 2024 as well as 0.9 percentage points lower than the forecast rate in January. The downward revision is a result of greater policy uncertainty, trade tensions, and a softer demand outlook, given slower-than-anticipated consumption growth. Tariffs are also expected to weigh on growth in 2026.
…
“For advanced economies, the inflation forecast for 2025 has been revised upward by 0.4 percentage points since January, [and] the US forecast by 1.0 percentage point. For the United States, this reflects stubborn price dynamics in the services sector as well as a recent uptick in the growth of the price of core goods (excluding food and energy) and the supply shock from recent tariffs.”

Put concisely, on the IMF’s “macro” scale, Mr. Trump’s tariff decrees have cut $300 billion of U.S. growth this year, raised U.S. inflation by a point, and damaged financial markets. The contraction of Pennsylvania’s Mack Truck operation is a local and personal example of all this, and it’s far from rare. Some more scenes from the past week: Minnesota manufacturers canceling expansion plans; Tennessee Asian restaurants, North Carolina craft brewers and Arizona auto dealerships facing sudden price spikes and loss of customers; Indiana landscapers seeing “fear in the market” and orders put on hold; Texas’ natural gas exporters grappling simultaneously with falling gas prices, higher port construction costs, and potential retaliations; and (seen through the eyes of Merced Rep. Adam Gray) California’s Central Valley farmers worrying about looming foreign retaliations against their $24 billion in exports of almonds, wine, vegetables, and other crops.

What might be done? Congress, not presidents, has Constitutional power over tariff rates and can stop the bleeding whenever it chooses. An inflection point will come next week as Sens. Wyden and Paul, having successfully gotten the Senate to pass one resolution in March to terminate the February Canada/Mexico/China “emergency” decree, now propose a second. This Joint Resolution would void the full April 2 decree, including its worldwide 10% tariff, its 125% tariff on Chinese-made goods, and its (temporarily suspended but not canceled) “reciprocal” tariffs of up to 50% on 57 countries. Their concise 72-word bill reads as follows:

“Joint Resolution terminating the national emergency declared to impose global tariffs.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

“That pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622), the national emergency declared on April 2, 2025, by the President in Executive Order 14257 (90 Fed. Reg. 15041) is terminated effective on the date of the enactment of this joint resolution.”

Senate passage of course is only one step. In their offices on the Capitol Building’s south end, Republican House leaders have spent the spring devising exotic procedural devices to avoid a vote on tariffs.  It’s worked so far, but their passivity, is not consensus. Trade Subcommittee Ranking Member Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-Calif.) leads all 19 House Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee (the one responsible for tariff policy) in a Resolution to void both February’s Canada/Mexico/China decree and the April 2 decree. And Constitution-friendly Republican Rep. Don Bacon from Nebraska offers another to require Congressional approval for any future “emergency” or “national security” tariffs.

Looking ahead to next week’s first step, a lot of harm is already done. And whether in the IMF’s “global economy” view, or the Lehigh Valley News’ “neighborhoods and communities” perspective, it is metastasizing daily. The sooner Congress reclaims its authority and restores Constitutionally legitimate policymaking, the less the harm will spread, and the more quickly the U.S. and the world alike will heal.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

The Constitution and its friends: 

U.S. Constitution text, from the National Archives. See Article I, Section 8, first clause, for “Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.”

Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Rand Paul (R-Ky.) propose terminating the April 2 “emergency” declaration.

Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-Calif.) and House Ways and Means Democrats propose terminating both the April 2 global and February 1 Canada/Mexico/China “emergency” decrees, and require any future “emergency” and “national security” tariffs to get Congressional approval.

And Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE) with Foreign Relations Ranking Member Greg Meeks (D-N.Y.), Jeff Hurd (R-Colo.), and Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.) with a look-ahead bill to require a Congressional vote on any future tariff imposition.

Real-world perspectives: 

The Lehigh Valley News on layoffs at Mack Truck.

… and State Rep. Josh Siegel appeals for Congressional delegation help.

Rep. Adam Gray (D-Calif.) on tariffs, retaliations, and the dent they’re putting in Central Valley farm exports and rural income.

Tennessee’s Asian restaurants and North Carolina’s craft brewers grapple with price shocks and lost business.

Arizona auto dealers and Indiana landscapers ponder falling sales, while Texas’ LNG exporters watch prices drop while infrastructure costs rise.

And economic analysis:

A gloomy look around the world from IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva.

And former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers (video, via the Peterson Institute for International Economics), explains the fallacies of Trump administration tariffs and their likely effects at home.

For more detail, the IMF’s April World Economic Outlook has growth, inflation, and other projections, and analysis of tariff shocks, business uncertainty, and their likely impacts.

… and as a comparison, its happier late-January Outlook update, with our justifiably apprehensive comment at the time.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

FACT: Five-eighths of U.S. imports are “business inputs,” three-eighths “consumer goods.”

THE NUMBERS:  Imports of U.S. goods by type, 2024 –

U.S. GDP. 2024	$29.185 trillion
All goods imports:	$3.270 trillion
Consumer goods:	$1.225 trillion
“Capital goods”:	$1.113 trillion
“Intermediate” goods:	$0.534 trillion
“Raw materials”:	$0.327 trillion

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Reviewing the likely effects of this month’s Trump administration tariffs on the U.S. space industry this week, PPI space expert Mary Guenther has a blunt warning:

“The ever-evolving tariff regime … will raise the cost of making rockets and satellites in the U.S., limit industry access to core inputs and materials, and encourage boycotts of American products and services abroad.” 

Some background, then we can place her judgment against the administration’s view that tariffs mean ‘more manufacturing industry’:

The Trump administration’s “reciprocal” tariff system launched at midnight last Wednesday. Greeted icily by the stock and bond markets the next morning, it lasted about 5½ hours before “pausing” just after lunch. It and may or may not resurface in July. The April 2 decree which created it, though, imposed not one but two new tariff systems. The second is still in place, though with big holes punched into it with a sudden Friday-night exemption for semiconductors, smartphones, TVs, and some other IT manufacturers. (This is roughly 22% of U.S. imports from China, and 10% of all imports, and may last or itself be replaced by a “national security” tariff in a month.) Assuming the administration sticks with v.3 for a while, or returns to v.2, here are the basics:

1.  Contents: The April 2 decree imposes
(a) a 10% tariff on all goods imports from countries other than China, Canada, and Mexico, except energy and (provisionally) the IT manufactures noted above;
(b) a 125% tariff on everything Chinese-made other than the IT goods (which, since the February Canada/Mexico/China decree remains in effect, makes a total rate of 145%, except the IT goods at 20%), and
(c) an exemption for Mexican- and Canadian-made goods entering under the still-surviving “USMCA.” Separate March decrees put 25% tariffs on cars, auto parts, steel, and aluminum, and the administration has threatened though not yet imposed similar 25% tariffs on medicine, lumber, copper, and semiconductor chips.
As a final note (d), the Congressionally authorized, Constitutionally legitimate tariff system is still in place and averages about 1.5%.

Tentatively assuming that the 145% tariff on Chinese goods means near but not total collapse of trade, while imports continue from the rest of the world, the likely overall U.S. average rate would then likely range from 15% to 20%.  In U.S. history, these rates resemble those of the Hoover administration from 1930-32.  Or, looking around the world today rather than backward through American history, the U.S.’ “peer” tariff economies would be countries such as Iran, Venezuela, Congo, and Chad in the 12% to 20% tariff range. (See below for a couple of tables.)

2. Impacts: What sort of impact would this tariff system have? In a “macro” sense, Yale BudgetLab estimates GDP growth cut by -1.1%, and prices up by 2.9%. More immediately, families buying clothes, groceries, appliances, flowers, and cars can expect prices to rise. (This won’t surprise them: the most recent UMichigan consumer-confidence survey reveals the highest inflation expectations since 1981.) But as Ms. Guenther implies and the numbers above show, imports of business inputs – “intermediate goods” like chemicals and metals, raw materials like energy and metal ores, and capital goods such as power equipment — are substantially larger than imports of consumer goods. So the Trump tariffs are likely to raise U.S. production costs even more than they raise mall and grocery prices.

This is why the administration’s view of tariffs that tariffs, in some way, make manufacturing companies larger seems so blinkered and naive. Taking automobiles as an example, the administration’s 25% tariff on cars would raise prices and push Americans to buy locally made cars. But its identical 25% tariffs on metals and parts (and depending on which administration official is speaking, on semiconductors too), plus its 10% tariffs on wiring, paint, glass, and so on, and its 125% tariff on any auto-related things made in China, will also make it much more expensive to build cars in the United States. So the likely outcome is that Americans will import fewer cars, and also buy fewer U.S.-made cars, while U.S.-made cars get more expensive abroad and also risk retaliation. That points to a smaller U.S. auto sector. The same goes for refrigerators, motorcycles, washing machines, planes, and the space industry’s rockets, satellites, guidance systems, specialized sensors and computers, and so on.

With this in mind, some specially protected “manufacturing sectors” might gain. But U.S. manufacturing in general will have higher costs and probably get relatively smaller. The earlier round of Trump tariffs provides some guidance here: per a 2023 U.S. International Trade Commission study, the 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs over three years raised the two metals’ output by $2.2 billion, but simultaneously shrank the U.S. auto parts, machinery, toolmaking and other metal-using industries by $3.5 billion. On a larger scale, since the metals and “301” tariffs on Chinese goods in 2018/2019, manufacturing has fallen from 10.9% to 9.9% of U.S. GDP.  Real manufacturing output growth and employment totals, meanwhile, have slowed from the annual $40 billion and 100,000 net jobs averages of the post-financial crisis Obama years to $30 billion and 30,000.

So: Good that the administration listened to the financial markets’ frank advice last week and, at least for now, abandoned its “reciprocal tariff” plan. They should keep listening — to markets worrying about macro impacts, to Guenther and other industry experts describing likely impacts on firms and industries, and to public opinion contemplating price shocks. All of them, in their different ways, are saying very similar things.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

Along these lines, applause for two new bills, introduced last week, to safeguard the U.S. economy and defend the Constitution:

House Ways and Means Democrats call for canceling the April 2 decree and the February decree relating to Canada and Mexico, and for requiring Congressional votes of approval for any new “emergency” or  “national security” tariffs.

Finance Committee Ranking Member Sen. Ron Wyden (R-Ore.) and Rand Paul (R-Ky.), likewise.

Current tariff rates:

The actual U.S. tariff schedule. It is not a very good system, but is Congressionally authorized and Constitutionally legitimate.

… the Trump administration’s April 2 tariff decree.

… the April 9 version.

… and the April 11 “Clarification of Revisions, as Amended.”

Backwards through history:

The U.S. International Trade Commission has U.S. tariff rates (trade-weighted) from 2024 back to 1891.

Around the world: 

The WTO’s Tariff Profiles 2024 makes it easy to look up and compare tariff rates (simple average, trade-weighted average, by sector, etc.).

… and the World Bank has an even easier interactive comparative table (though with “trade-weighted” tariff rates only) by country from the World Bank.

And a couple of tables:

1.  An educated guess at this week’s U.S. tariff rate, placed against tariff rates abroad and in U.S. history:

United States (Trump v.1 “reciprocal,” April 2, 2025)	30.0%??
Bermuda	29.5%
United States (Hoover administration, 1932)	19.8%
United States (Trump v.2, April 9, 2025)	18.0%??
Chad	16.8%
Republic of Congo	15.2%
United States (Trump v.3, April 12, 2025)	15.0%??
Venezuela	12.8%
Ethiopia	12.7%
Iran	12.1%
Zimbabwe	11.4%
Egypt	10.4%

 

European Union	2.7%
U.S. (2024)	2.4%
China	2.2%
Japan	1.9%
U.S. (2016)	1.5%
Singapore	0.0%

* WTO Tariff Profiles 2024 when available; World Bank database for Egypt, Iran, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Chad. Bermuda’s average tariff rate is the highest known current rate.

  2.  And an attempted breakdown of imports by current tariff type (though policy has been changing unpredictably).  Using last year’s $3.27 trillion in imports as a base, and assuming the semiconductor, smart-phone, TV, etc., exemption stays on:

Chinese-made: 145% on $345 billion.

“National security” (232): 25% on about $500 billion in cars, auto parts, steel & aluminum, likely also medicines, copper, and lumber.

China partial exemptions: 20% (for now) on $96 billion in Chinese-made semiconductors, TVs, smartphones, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and solar technology.

April 2 decree “worldwide”: 10% on about $1.2 trillion in Asian but non-Chinese, European, Latin American and Caribbean, Middle East, African, and Pacific goods.

0%: About $820 billion in “USMCA” goods, plus all energy, plus $200 billion worth of exempted and non-Chinese-made semiconductors and other IT goods.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

FACT: Trump tariffs have nothing at all to do with ‘reciprocity.’

THE NUMBERS:  

Trump tariff on anything from Lesotho:	50.0%
Current U.S. tariff on Lesotho goods:	0.0%

WHAT THEY MEAN:

A small landlocked country of 2.2 million in southern Africa, Lesotho’s modest shipments of clothing – $230 million worth last year — accounts for 0.007% of American imports. The Trump administration has singled this out for a 50% tariff, the highest rate anywhere in the world. Should it stay on, the tariff will likely cripple Lesotho’s economy and immiserate the 12,900 young women at work stitching shirts and blue jeans around Maseru this afternoon. Much the same will happen in Cambodia, Madagascar, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vanuatu, Sri Lanka, and dozens of other low-income countries.

How did this happen?  Background, and a look at the likely effects.

Having spent the last three months claiming that Americans are victims, immiserated, plundered, etc., by “unfair” trade barriers in foreign countries and arguing for “reciprocal” tariffs, the Trump administration seems to have decided in March that calculating “reciprocity” was too hard. The tariffs Mr. Trump imposed by decree last Wednesday – in effect as of this morning – have nothing at all to do with foreign tariffs on American goods.  Instead, the administration did two quite different things:

(1)  Gave every country in the world a 10% tariff. (For those interested in reciprocity, a flawed but not wholly useless concept, the average world tariff is probably a bit above 3%.) This appears to be added to, rather than replacing, the existing 2.4% average. Based on records kept by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the resulting ~12.4% tariff rate would be the U.S.’ highest since the Depression of the 1930s.

(2)  Created a second set of tariff rates for 57 countries (counting the 27-member European Union as a single economy) with which the U.S. ran a “goods trade deficit’” in 2024. I.e., Americans bought more from the relevant place than we sold to people there. (Russia, a -$2.5 billion deficit country last year, gets an exemption.) As practical examples, this means surtaxes of 20% on Dutch cheese and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 26% on Korean cars and computers, 48% on Cambodian shirts, 28% on Tunisian dates and jewelry, and so on.

Where do these numbers come from? The administration appears to have gotten them not by looking up tariff rates abroad – though they’re easy to find – but from a four-column spreadsheet based on an arithmetical formula. One column has the dollar value of American exports (excluding services trade, so Hollywood film revenue, telemedicine, foreign-student tuition, tech-sector search and data analytics, financial services, architecture and engineering contracts, etc., count as nothing). The second column has the value of goods-only trade deficits, or “exports minus imports.” The third column calculates a “trade balance to imports” ratio, and the fourth divides this ratio by two to get a supposed ‘reciprocal’ tariff.

Here’s a real-world case: The Falkland Islands – a British South Atlantic territory home to 3,162 people – gets hit with a 42% tariff. They sold Americans $22.8 million worth of toothfish and squid last year (fisheries are 40% of the Falklands economy) while buying $4.1 million worth of American airplane parts, ceiling fans, and computer accessories. The administration gets its 42% ‘reciprocal tariff’ on Falklands goods from the following formula:

{(fish – airplane parts)/fish}/2.

Spelling it out, fish minus airplane parts equals $18.7 million.  Divided by fish ($22.8 million), this yields a ratio of “0.84.” Division of this by two then produces the 42% “reciprocal” tariff. Obviously this has nothing to do with Falkland Islands tariffs, nor America’s either. Neither does it get more logical results anywhere else. Some examples, placing the Trump tariff against the actual trade-weighted average tariff rates published in the WTO’s World Tariff Profiles 2024:

Trump tariff on Bosnian goods:	36.0%
Bosnian average trade-weighted tariff:	6.2%
Trump tariff on Brazilian goods:	10.0%
Brazil average trade-weighted tariff:	6.7%
Trump tariff on Jordanian goods:	20.0%
Jordan tariff on U.S. goods (FTA partner)	0.0%
Trump tariff on Madagascar goods:	47.0%
Madagascar average trade-weighted tariff:	8.7%
Trump tariff on UK goods	10.0%
UK average trade-weighted tariffs:	2.3%
Trump tariff on Vietnamese goods:	46.0%
Vietnamese average trade-weighted tariff:	4.5%

 

This sort of fecklessness has drawn appropriate derision from economists. It is also, though, bringing real-world results varying from absurd through disastrous to genuinely tragic. The Falklands’ case is in the “absurd” category – they sell most of their squid and toothfish to Europe anyway – and Falklanders can ridicule it, get angry, or sadly shake their heads depending on temperament. The “disastrous” effects are piling up daily in financial markets and industry sites – about 5% of American wealth already vanished in the last week, likely future layoffs and price spikes, etc.

Others can’t laugh it off. Twelve of the 57 countries on the administration’s list are “least-developed” states: Angola, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chad, DR Congo, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Zambia, Zimbabwe – as well as many more lower-middle income (e.g. Pakistan and Sri Lanka), small southern-Europe democracies under Russian pressure such as Moldova and Bosnia, Arab-world allies like Tunisia and Jordan, Asia-Pacific Treaty allies Philippines and Thailand, small island states Vanuatu and Fiji, and more.

U.S. trade with the least-developed countries in particular, though small in the $7 trillion world of American trade flows, is often an essential source of wage employment, macroeconomic stability, and poverty alleviation. Lesotho’s case is illustrative of the harms they will suffer, but also extraordinary for the scale of the tariff and its likely human impact.

Over the past generation, the country’s 33 garment companies have been especially successful users of the African Growth and Opportunity Act’s tariff waivers, and as a result, are Lesotho’s largest source of wage-paying jobs. Southern Africa, being the region hit hardest by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, Lesotho also has the world’s second-highest adult HIV-positive rate at 19.3% of adults. The garment factories joined the American PEPFAR program – USAID had a $47 million health commitment to Lesotho – as important providers of HIV treatment and education.

Their $230 million worth of clothes account for about 0.2% of American clothing imports. That’s about a day’s worth of U.S. clothes shopping a year, and makes up the “0.007%” of total imports noted above. They also create a ‘bilateral trade deficit’ a bit above $200 million. Since Lesotho doesn’t buy very much, and most American products there arrive via South Africa, the ‘ratio’ formula has pushed Lesotho to the very top of its list. The resulting 50% tariff, an artifact of the Trump calculators’ indifference and laziness, may destroy the industry and its workers’ livelihoods by summer. Considering that this economic blow comes simultaneously with the destruction of USAID and “pause” in PEPFAR’s Lesotho work, the word ‘tragic’ is strong but probably not strong enough.

** Very recent update, 1:45 p.m.: these now seem to be ‘paused’ for 90 days after a financial-market and public-opinion hurricane of opposition. We’ll see; if this is so and the ‘reciprocal’ tariffs stay off, at least for now the ‘10%’ global rate seems to remain.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

Comparing tariff rates:

Trump administration’s decree imposing tariffs; see “Annex I” for list of countries.

And for those genuinely interested in “reciprocity,” the WTO’s Tariff Profiles 2024 makes it easy to look up and compare rates.

And reports on the impacts abroad:

The Lesotho Embassy.

… responses from government, academia, and business from Maseru-based Lesotho Reporter.

… and from the Guardian, on-site reaction from Lesotho workers and government.

… and the U.S. Trade Representative Office’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) page.

Via the BBC, a view from the Falklands.

… and the Falkland Islands Fishing Companies Association.

And Nikkei talks with Phnom Penh garment workers.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

FACT: U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall have power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.”

THE NUMBERS: Consumer confidence “Expectations Index”* – 

March 2025:	65.2
February 2025:	72.9
(Recession level)	(80.0)
December 2024:	81.1
October 2024:	89.1

* Conference Board, March 25, 2025

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Is Mr. Trump’s tariff binge — now delayed until 4:00 today, presumably to avoid split-screen footage placing tariff announcements against crashing financial markets, but said to include extensive new taxation of cars, semiconductors, OTC and prescription medicines, Canadian energy, Chinese toys, Mexican fruits and vegetables, etc. — really “the largest peacetime tax increase in history.” The White House’s claim of a $600 billion increase in annual tariff collection would be about 2.2% of GDP. That would make it at least a contender for the title, though it might wind up below the introduction of the Social Security and Medicare taxes in the 1930s and 1960s.

But if the scale remains a little blurry, the public’s view seems by comparison sharp and clear: higher prices and fear for the future. The Conference Board’s survey of American “consumer confidence” (March 25, done after tariffs on Canada/Mexico/China but before last week’s on cars) suggests opinion has gone far enough south to reach the “Tierra del Fuego” latitudes, where phrases like “nose-dive” and “free fall” turn up. Here’s their ashen-faced release a week ago Tuesday:

“The Expectations Index – based on consumers’ short-term outlook for income, business, and labor conditions – dropped 9.6 points to 65.2, the lowest level in 12 years [ed. note: lowest since the end of the post-2008 financial crisis] and well below the threshold of 80 that usually signals a recession ahead.  … Optimism about future income – which had held up quite strongly over the past few months – largely vanished, suggesting worries about the economy and the labor market have started to spread into consumers’ assessment of their personal situations. … [R]esponses also showed that inflation is still a major concern for consumers and that worries about the impact of trade policies and tariffs in particular are on the rise.”

Should the public be that worried? Recent experience offers little guidance, since no administration since Herbert Hoover’s in 1930 has tried something like this. Warning lights are flashing red in GDP outlook, financial markets and manufacturing  (“bearish market sentiment and tariff applications and costs have dominated discussions”) as well as in consumer confidence.  And some real-world leading indicators — say, layoffs in steel factories specialized in automotive metal — are turning down. But apart from the layoffs, these are still mostly “signs and portents.” Spring will bring more reliable stats on macro employment/price/growth impacts; effects on goods-buying industries such as factories, farms, restaurants, retail, and building contractors; and the fortunes of the American export manufacturing and farming, services and digital, and IP sectors now suddenly targets for retaliation.

But whatever the economic gashes and wounds, the most important long-term harm will likely be elsewhere. After all, governments often make policy errors, sometimes they’re pretty big, and countries usually recover in time. (Though recuperation from Hoover’s required a lot of time). Damage to governance goes deeper. And here, Mr. Trump’s approach — bad-faith “emergency” and “national security” declarations, coupled with Executive Orders attempting to create tariffs by decree — carries the risk of infection to the political system separate from its economic consequences.

The Constitution gives Congress, not presidents, authority to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises,” as well as “regulation of Commerce with foreign nations.” For good reason: giving any single individual power to set tax rates means not only heightened danger of impulsive and unsound decisions, but temptation to use that novel power in corrupt ways — to reward family members, cronies, and supporters, and/or to harm political critics, business rivals, and opposition strongholds.

Earlier presidents never questioned this principle. The sepia-tinged pre-New Deal pols who wanted tariff hikes (e.g., Hoover, Warren G. Harding, William McKinley, Benjamin Harrison) asked Congress to pass bills and sign the result. Historians debate the economic merits, but their tariff increases had a Constitutional legitimacy Mr. Trump’s program wholly lacks. Should his program stick, it will weaken the separation of powers, usurp authority over taxation, and substitute one-man “rule by decree” for authentic (if sometimes ill-judged) law. Next to this, costs to growth, jobs, and living standards are more immediately painful but likely lesser issues.

Where to next? Court cases this year may limit Mr. Trump’s options, but there’s a simpler and better solution: Congress has the power it needs to defend its authority, and should use it. House Speaker Mike Johnson and Ways and Means Committee Chairman Jason Smith, and their Senate counterparts Majority Leader John Thune as Majority Leader and Finance Committee Chair Mike Crapo, need only — per their oath of office to “protect and defend the Constitution” — call a vote. If Congress likes Mr. Trump’s tariffs, it can impose them in the proper way. If not, it should say “no” and end them.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;

• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;

• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;

• Offer a positive alternative.

The Constitution and its friends:  

Official U.S. Constitution text, from the National Archives. See Article I, Section 8, first clause, for “Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.”

PPI’s look last fall at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the tax power, and the harm inherent in rule by decree.

• Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), with Sens. Klobuchar, Coons, and Paul (respectively Ds-Minn. and Del., R-Ky.), have a resolution this week to repeal the March “emergency” declaration used as a pretext for tariffs on Canadian goods.
• Reps. Don Beyer (D-Va.) and Suzanne DelBene (D-Wash.) on ensuring that any tariff imposed on “emergency” or “national security” grounds must get Congressional approval.
• Rep. Brad Schneider (D-Ill.) on scrapping a surviving Hoover legacy, “Section 338.”
• Rep. Jimmy Panetta (D-Calif.) on ensuring Congressional approval for balance-of-payments tariffs.

On the other side: 

Two hours before today’s White House tariff decrees are supposed to be released, neither their texts nor their content are yet public. For interim reading in their absence, try the President’s Trade Agenda report, put out by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative on March 3. Each year this is supposed to lay out the year’s main goals and activities. This year’s edition has a lot of puzzling gaps. The report does converge at some points with the options floated in the press this past week. But it doesn’t mention taxation of cars and medicine, trade wars with Canada and Mexico, or any large overall tariff.

Leading indicators:

Conference Board finds Americans fearful, expecting a recession, and thinking a lot about tariffs.

… the University of Michigan’s consumer-confidence survey finds the same thing. Sample:

“The expectations index plunged a precipitous 18% and has now lost more than 30% since November 2024. This month’s decline reflects a clear consensus across all demographic and political affiliations; Republicans joined independents and Democrats in expressing worsening expectations since February for their personal finances, business conditions, unemployment, and inflation. Consumers continue to worry about the potential for pain amid ongoing economic policy developments. Notably, two-thirds of consumers expect unemployment to rise in the year ahead, the highest reading since 2009.”

And about that “$6 trillion”: 

Concise judgment from Ben Ritz and Alex Kilander this February: Trump administration tariffs are “bad tax policy that don’t raise much revenue but do raise costs for businesses and households.”

And Laura Duffy’s It’s Not 1789 Anymore: Why Trump’s Backwards Tariff Agenda Would Harm America (October 2024) on the First Congress and the deep flaws of tariffs as a form of taxation: can’t raise enough revenue to support a modern government; non-transparent to the public and thus unusually easy for well-connected interest groups to manipulate; inequitable as business taxation and regressive as consumer taxation; large harms to “downstream” industries and their workers.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

FACT: The Trump administration is trying to find foreign eggs to lower prices, then immediately tax them to raise prices.

THE NUMBERS: Egg prices,* per dozen large Grade A –

February 2025:	$5.90
December 2024:	$4.15
February 2024:	$3.00

* National averages, via. St. Louis Federal Reserve’s “FRED” Economic Data system.

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Quick followup to our look at public opinion on tariffs last week: A poll released by Fox News (on Friday, two days after our piece) matched the four-fathoms-underwater responses to CNN/SSRS and Reuters/IPSOS: 28% thought tariffs would be good for the economy and 53% bad. More generally, this poll finds “inflation, prices, and the cost of living” the top public concern, cited by 27% of all respondents. “Economy and jobs” is next at 16%. And those thinking of inflation this year often envision an egg.

Eggs are one of those common products, like gasoline or fresh vegetables, where very visible price hikes make people sensitive. Among the apparently sensitized is the Secretary of Agriculture, Brooke Rollins, who is cajoling South Korea and Turkey this month to sell us more eggs. Here’s a passage from Hoosier Ag Today:

“[Rollins] says USDA is also working to temporarily increase the import of eggs in order to increase the supply available for consumers. “Turkey and South Korea have both confirmed they will be increasing breaker egg imports into the U.S. …USDA continues conversations—in fact, I was on one earlier today regarding another country who’s ready to import a significant amount of eggs in the short term, but we continue to work that issue very, very aggressively—again, just for the short term, to keep getting the price of eggs down.”

Two points on this:

1. “Autarkic” economies often suffer shortages and price shocks: Economies with tight import limits, whether whole countries or individual ‘sectors’, suffer price shocks and shortages more frequently than “open” economies with more diversified sources of supply. As the U.S. infant formula crisis was the 2022/23 example, eggs are this year’s, with prices doubling since the outbreak of avian flu last spring.

The lost output is hard to replace because only a few countries can sell eggs to Americans. Policy is jointly and fiercely patrolled by USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Agricultural Marketing Service, for “high path avian influenza” and “virulent newcastle.” The three agencies, for understandable reasons, require countries hoping to sell eggs to American grocery stores to have food-safety systems comparable to that of the United States, and the individual poultry operations hatching them out to pass FDA inspection.

In principle this is correct — health and safety first; set policy through science and medicine rather than through responses to fears or price concerns. And in contrast to infant formula, where strict quotas and high tariffs make it very hard for American groceries to buy, eggs don’t have especially high import barriers. (Egg tariffs, HTS 04072100, are now 2.8 cents per dozen, or a quarter of a cent per egg.) But in practice, the regulatory gauntlet is so costly and difficult that egg trade is very small. USDA’s “Global Agricultural Trade System” database reports only two countries — Canada and Turkey — selling us any significant quantity, and even they don’t do much. (Canada shipped about 2.7 million dozen fresh eggs last year, Turkey 5.7 million dozen, and the rest of the world a few thousand dozen more.) The U.S. egg industry, by comparison, shipped about 53,000 million dozen to groceries each year, which puts imports below 1% of egg sales.

In such circumstances, as with infant formula three years ago, domestic problems bring swift consequences and they tend to last.  When last fall’s avian flu outbreak slashed U.S. production, shortages and price spikes followed immediately. So a dozen eggs now cost twice what they did last spring. Ms. Rollin’s Easter weekend egg hunt, like the Defense Department’s infant formula airlift two years ago, illustrates the effect of tough import limits even when the rationale for them is understandable.

2.  The Trump administration is trying to simultaneously lower and raise egg prices: Meanwhile, the rest of the administration is trying to make eggs cost more. As Ms. Rollins looks for ways to bring egg prices down, Mr. Trump has spent the past month hyping a plan to personally impose tariffs of 10%, 25%, or some yet-to-be-decided random level, on eggs and other products from Canada, the European Union, Mexico, China, and maybe every other country in the world.

Supposedly these tariffs, on chicken eggs and the other 11,413 additional “tariff lines,” will hit next week. Courts may well declare this plan unconstitutional: Congress, not presidents, has the power to set rates for “Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.” But if courts allow it on the basis of vaguely written statutes and precedent from case law, the new tariffs will put a heavy tax on all the eggs Ms. Rollins can find, and cancel much, or all, or “more than all” of whatever egg price relief she may achieve.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;

• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices, and family budgets, and living standards;

• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;

• Offer a positive alternative.

Health and sickness:

The CDC has avian flu updates and counts of affected birds.

A perspective from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service explains egg import rules.

And the FDA’s egg standards.

Trade:

St. Louis Fed’s FRED services track egg prices.

Rollins and USDA on egg price strategy.

And egg-trade links from the Agricultural Marketing Service.

A reminder:

PPI in 2022 on the infant formula crisis.

And last:

Mr. Kennedy, the Health and Human Services Secretary, has suggested just letting avian flu spread around so that, eventually, hopefully, chicken populations gain immunity to it. Scientific American points out that encouraging the unchecked spread of disease is unwise, and new strains of flu virus rapidly replace old ones.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

FACT: Americans dislike tariff increases and high prices.

THE NUMBERS: Political “independents,” asked*: “Do you approve or disapprove of Donald Trump’s handling of tariffs?” –

Disapprove:	71%
Approve:	29%

* CNN/SSRS, March 6-9, 2025

WHAT THEY MEAN:

What do Americans think of the Trump administration’s tariff binge? As a point of departure, here’s the “Chapter One” pledge from last fall’s Republican party platform:

“The Republican Party will reverse the worst inflation crisis in four decades that has crushed the middle class, devastated family budgets, and pushed the dream of homeownership out of reach for millions.  We will defeat inflation, tackle the cost-of-living crisis, improve fiscal sanity, restore price stability, and quickly bring down prices.”

We noted at the time that promises to cut prices and to raise tariffs – that came four notches down, in “Chapter Five” — contradict one another. (Lewis Carroll’s White Queen might happily believe six impossible things before breakfast.  Alice knows they’re impossible nonetheless.) A hypothetical Trump administration, we predicted, would have to choose between them.

The actual administration now appears to have chosen. Here’s the Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, telling Americans they’re wrong to care about the cost of goods, and the administration’s policy will likely bring prices up, not down:

  “Access to cheap goods is not the essence of the American dream.  … [shift to mumbling voice] Can tariffs be a one-time price adjustment? Yes.”

Insights from three different sources — consumer confidence surveys, public opinion polls, and House of Representatives debate — give some sense of what Americans now believe tariffs do, whether they like the administration’s approach, and how strongly they may feel.

First, the Conference Board’s February consumer-confidence readout and the University of Michigan’s March survey find Americans expecting prices to rise and believing they know why. The Conference Board summary:

  “Average 12-month inflation expectations surged from 5.2% to 6% in February. This increase likely reflected a mix of factors, including sticky inflation but also the recent jump of prices of key household staples like eggs and the expected impact of tariffs.  References to inflation and prices in general continue to rank high in write-in responses, but the focus shifted towards other topics. There was a sharp increase in the mentions of trade and tariffs, back to a level unseen since 2019. Most notably, comments on the current Administration and its policies dominated the responses.” 

Second, March public opinion polls suggest that Americans put more value than Mr. Bessent on cheap goods (see below for why this might be) and aren’t persuaded that tariff hikes will bring them much good in exchange. One, a CNN/SSRS poll done between March 6 and 9, asks about Mr. Trump’s handling of tariff policy. Reuters/IPSOS (March 3 to 5), meanwhile, asks about tariff increases in the abstract without mentioning Mr. Trump personally. Findings:

CNN/SSRS: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling tariffs?”

	Approve	Disapprove
All respondents	39%	61%
Political independents	29%	71%
Republicans	80%	20%
Democrats	6%	93%
Non-college	41%	59%
Under 35	28%	72%
Over 45	45%	54%
Men	39%	60%
Women	39%	61%
Earns less than $50,000	38%	62%

 

Reuters/IPSOS:

	Agree	Disagree
“It’s a good idea to charge tariffs even if prices increase.”	32%	53%
“When the U.S. charges tariffs, American workers come out ahead.”	31%	49%
“Increasing tariffs will do more harm than good.”	53%	31%

 

Both show the administration (a) nearly four fathoms “underwater,” (b) holding a core Republican vote but not persuading anybody else, and (c) losing the “swing” and “non-white working-class” voters who last fall thought Mr. Trump would at least try to “quickly bring prices down.”

Third, political-system reactions — specifically, debate last week in the House of Representatives — cast some indirect light on the intensity of feeling. House Democrats, guided by Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Greg Meeks, requested a vote last Wednesday to terminate the “emergency” declaration Mr. Trump is using to threaten tariffs on the energy, cars, groceries, home-building materials, medicines, and so on Americans buy from Canada and Mexico.  Rather than defend this, their Republican counterparts dodged by writing a surreal “House Rule,” declaring the last 9½ months of 2025 to be a single “day.”  Mr. Meeks:

“‘Each day for the remainder of the first session of the 119th Congress shall not constitute a calendar day.’ What? If you don’t think that makes any sense, neither do I. House Republicans are declaring that the days are no longer days and that time has literally stopped.”

It doesn’t make sense. But in the arcane ‘House Calendar world’, it does prevent a debate and avert a vote.  That day’s Congressional Record reports 23 comments on tariffs by House Democrats and none by Republicans. Rule of thumb: House members have a keen sense of local reaction to issues.  When they don’t want to talk about something, there’s a reason. At least for now, the administration’s choice to abandon its “bring down prices” pledge, and raise tariffs instead, doesn’t seem one many Americans like.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

In this spirit, the Congressional Record for March 12 (pp. H1083 – H1183) records an honorable day for Rep. Meeks and House Democrats.  They are right on policy, to keep costs down for hourly-wage Americans trying to manage family budgets and to oppose unprovoked attacks on America’s neighbors and friends. And they are right on principle: Congress, not the president, has authority over “Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises”, and attempts by presidents to bypass this and impose tariffs by decree are fundamentally anti-Constitutional. We applaud.

Public opinion:

CNN/SSRS on Mr. Trump’s handling of tariffs, budgets, the economy in general, and more.

Reuters/IPSOS on the same topics, without attaching them personally to Trump.

Quinnipiac (March 6-10) on Mr. Trump’s approach to trade with China, Canada, and Mexico.

The Conference Board (Feb. 25) finds consumers losing confidence and worried about tariffs and their price impact.

… and the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey gets similar results.

Meanwhile:

As Americans worry about price increases, retaliations against American exporters are piling up. Current status:

• Canadian against $20 billion of U.S. steel, tech, and other exports.
• EU against $28 billion worth of American motorcycles, whiskey, beef, textiles, and other food and manufactured goods.
• Chinese against $28 billion in soybeans, chicken, wheat, pork, and other farm exports.

So far, they have chosen to use tariffs hitting American manufacturers and farmers. More inventive things with wider target ranges are ahead:

• Ontario Premier Doug Ford threatens a 25% ‘export tariff’ on Ontario’s energy sales to households, utilities, and businesses in New York, Michigan, and Minnesota.  The administration is puzzlingly irate: a Canadian export tariff has exactly the same impact on Americans as Mr. Trump’s own tariffs on Canadian energy. Why complain?
• The European Union’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, designed in 2023 to counteract Chinese trade pressures, can fade protection of U.S. patents, trademarks, and copyright, or tax services exports such as film, TV programs, and digital platforms.

And last — Tariffs, the hedge-fund alum, and the single mom:

Back to Mr. Bessent: “Cheap goods are not the essence of the American dream.” Without wealth-bashing for its own sake, that’s kind of easy for him to say …

Tariffs are taxes on purchases of physical goods, incorporated in store prices for shoppers and in production costs for goods-using businesses like manufacturers, restaurants, farms, and building contractors. That means they’re toughest on people who spend a lot of their money on goods.  Who might these people be?

The BLS’ Consumer Expenditure Survey finds that in 2023, America’s single-parent families spent 40% of their $52,462 post-tax median income on food, clothes, home furnishings, and other goods. This is twice the 20% of income that the top-decile families (median post-tax, $259,432) spent on goods. Put more directly, tariffs hit the waitressing single mom twice as hard as the law firm partner. Mr. Bessent, a hedge-fund alum whose income comes from real estate rentals, royalties, and capital gains, is an extreme case even in the top decile, probably spending closer to 1% than 20% of income on physical, tariff-able goods.  So he may personally have trouble seeing why anyone would care if food and clothing prices jump.

For better analysis and policy advice, Treasury can turn to Laura Duffy’s It’s Not 1789 Anymore: Why Trump’s Backward Tariff Agenda Would Harm America. As she explains, tariffs — though a defensible choice among the bad revenue options available to 18th-century Americans, or to the present-day governments of extremely poor and/or unstable countries — are a poor form of taxation and badly wrong for modern America: can’t raise enough revenue; non-transparent; regressive and inequitable; severe downstream harm.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.