FACT: Height of papers needed to qualify T-shirt as ‘CAFTA duty-free’: ~ four inches.

THE NUMBERS: U.S. clothing import growth, 2005-2022* –

World	+$30.2 billion
Vietnam	+$15.7 billion
Bangladesh	+$7.3 billion
China	+$4.0 billion
Cambodia	+$2.8 billion
India	+$2.8 billion
Indonesia	+$2.8 billion
Pakistan	+$1.6 billion
CAFTA/DR**	+$1.4 billion
Jordan	+$0.9 billion
Egypt	+$0.8 billion
Italy	+$0.8 billion
Haiti	+$0.6 billion
Kenya	+$0.3 billion
Ethiopia	+$0.3 billion
Peru	+$0.2 billion
Colombia	-$0.3 billion
Korea	-$1.0 billion
Mexico	-$2.6 billion
Hong Kong	-$3.5 billion

* * Counting from completion of CAFTA/DR. See below for a more recent count of change 2012-2022.
** Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic as a group.  More detail: Nicaragua +$2.0 billion, Honduras +$0.6 billion, El Salvador +$0.3 billion, Guatemala +$0.1 billion, Costa Rica -$0.5 billion, Dominican Republic -$1.2 billion.

WHAT THEY MEAN:

CBP’s “border encounter” statistics show about 34,000 Central Americans reaching the U.S.’ southern border each month so far this year. Ten years ago, following their trek north in his book The Beast* (2010) Salvadoran journalist Oscar Martinez recounts stories of gang kidnappings and extortion, rape and sexual abuse, fatal falls from the roofs of trains along the way, and likely arrest at the end. Asking himself in closing why anyone would make such a trip, Martinez decides that the largest cause is simple:

“They’re unable to accept that miserable routine of waking up at five in the morning to travel two hours on a dangerous public transit system to get to a fast-food restaurant or a market or a warehouse in San Salvador, or Tegucigalpa, or Guatemala City, where they spend the whole day toiling away at undignified work only to return to their small homes, dog-tired, making a measly minimum wage that barely lets them afford beans and tortillas for their children.”

Vice President Kamala Harris makes a similar comment in a February conference on the “Northern Triangle” (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador):

“[P]eople generally do not want to leave home.  And when they do, it is because they are either fleeing some harm or because staying home will mean that they cannot satisfy the basic needs of their family and themselves.”

The conclusion drawn from their comments — that if the U.S. has a particular interest easing political stress and migration pressure in Central America, American policy should encourage investment and higher-quality employment — has a forty-year history. Four decades ago, the Ronald Reagan/Tip O’Neill “Caribbean Basin Initiative” aimed to encourage clothing-making in Central America by waiving U.S. tariffs under a complex legal formula known as “Section 807,” which offered buyers of Central American-made clothes duty-free treatment so long as the shirts, blouses, etc. were made of U.S.-produced fabric. The hope was that a growing garment industry would create many jobs, dampen the economic volatility arising from heavy reliance on fruit and coffee exports, reduce the social temperature, and so ease peace-making. A decade later, Central American maquiladora factories — long lines of sewing machines operated by young women; complementary male employment in factory repair, and transport — provided $4.8 billion of America’s $39.4 billion in clothing imports, or about eighth (by value) of the total.

After 20 years, the “CAFTA-DR” – the full and permanent Free Trade Agreement now joining the U.S. with Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic – replaced the CBI in phases from 2005 through 2009. Its hope was that a permanent agreement would make the region more competitive and build buyer confidence. But in practice, this hasn’t exactly happened. Though Central America’s clothing trade has grown a bit in dollar terms, despite its tariff advantage the region’s share of U.S. imports has dropped from 12.3% in 2005 to 10.1% in 2022. Though CAFTA-DR clothes have no tariff, while as of 2022 Asian clothes were taxed at an average of 18.8%,** most new clothing imports in the last two decades have come from Asia. (China in the 2000s, Vietnam and Bangladesh in the 2010s and 2020s). Also a bit striking: imports from FTA partner Jordan and ‘preference’ beneficiary Haiti (which operates under another upgrade of CBI rather than a free trade agreement), though smaller overall, have grown much faster than imports from the CAFTA-DR countries.

Why?  A plausible explanation is the complexity and costliness of the CAFTA/DR agreement. Like its CBI predecessor, CAFTA-DR retains a clause — known as a “yarn-forward rule” in apparel-trade jargon — requiring nearly all of (say) a T-shirt’s cloth and yarn*** to be made in the U.S. or a CAFTA country to qualify it for duty-free status. This means very restricted supply options for garment factories — to cite FTA partners only, no high-quality Peruvian cotton, no Colombian cloth, no Korean yarn or thread. Furthermore, CAFTA/DR includes a 143-page list of “product-specific rules of origin” writing special provisions for individual products meant to suit the very specific business models of many individual U.S. firms as of 2005. As a case in point, the agreement’s denim rules were meant to guide Central American manufacturers to fabric from a particular U.S. mill in North Carolina. As a sample of the daunting legal language this entails, here’s a passage drawn from the 2007 “textile amendment” requiring users to monitor the width of wool in the lining of jackets and skirts down to the half-micron:

“Chapter Rule 1 Except for fabrics classified in tariff item 5408.22.aa, 5408.23.aa, 5408.23.bb, or 5408.24.aa, the fabrics identified in the following headings and subheadings, when used as visible lining material in certain men’s and women’s suits, suit-type jackets, skirts, overcoats, carcoats, anoraks, windbreakers, and similar articles, other than men’s and boys’ and women’s and girls’ suits, trousers, suit-type jackets and blazers, vests, and women’s and girls’ skirts of wool fabric, of subheadings 6203.11, 6203.31, 6203.41, 6204.11, 6204.31, 6204.51, 6204.61, 6211.39, or 6211.41, provided that such goods are not made of carded wool fabric or made from wool yarn having an average fiber diameter of less than or equal to 18.5 microns, must be both formed from yarn and finished in the territory of one or more of the Parties: 51.11 through 51.12, 5208.31 through 5208.59, 5209.31 through 5209.59, 5210.31 through 5210.59, 5211.31 through 5211.59, 5212.13 through 5212.15, 5212.23 through 5212.25, 5407.42 through 5407.44, 5407.52 through 5407.54, 5407.61, 5407.72 through 5407.74, 5407.82 through 5407.84, 5407.92 through 5407.94, 5408.22 through 5408.24, 5408.32 through 5408.34, 5512.19, 5512.29, 5512.99, 5513.21 through 5513.49, 5514.21 through 5515.99, 5516.12 through 5516.14, 5516.22 through 5516.24, 5516.32 through 5516.34, 5516.42 through 5516.44, 5516.92 through 5516.94, 6001.10, 6001.92, 6005.31 through 6005.44, or 6006.10 through 6006.44.

Compliance with these rules requires 31 classes of documents ranging from bills of lading and employee time-cards to contracts with dyers and finishers, invoices, proofs of payment and so on; the resulting sheaf of paper is said typically to be about four inches high. Apart from the cost and lawyer-hours involved in verifying all this, rules designed for specific products from particular factories tend to lose relevance over time. In the denim case, the plant in question closed after a chemical accident in 2017, and since then Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have stopped selling jeans to the U.S.

Thus CAFTA producers have been treading water as full-tariff competitors in Southeast Asia boomed. The Jordan agreement and the Haiti programs, simpler as they require only a showing of local added value rather than requiring detailed sourcing, appear much more successful.

Turning back now to Martinez’ journalism and Vice President Harris’ observation, the main point – to lower social temperatures and reduce migration pressure — still seems like a strong one. With it in mind, can we do better?  Could individual pieces of the CAFTA/DR that are no longer relevant – perhaps the denim piece — be scrapped? Could Congress allow Central American factories to use cloth and yarn from FTA partners, or Latin America generally? Or perhaps the whole thing might be redone, merged with the “USMCA” and the string of smaller FTAs going south from Panama to Colombia, Peru, and Chile?

* A bit dated as a description of the migrant route around 2010, but still relevant. ‘The Beast’, La Bestia, is a migrant nickname for southern Mexican freight trains.
** Counting Chinese products, many of which are subject to the Trump administration’s additional “301” tariffs. The 2022 rate for Asian clothes excluding Chinese-made goods was 16.6%.
*** Using a cotton T-shirt because this (HTS 61091000) is the top import from the CAFTA/DR countries, at $2.8 billion of the U.S.’ $35 billion in total imports (everything, clothes, coffee, oil, mangoes, etc.) from these countries last year. 

 

FURTHER READING:

Harris on Central America strategy this February.

The White House’s “Root Causes of Migration” strategy document.

And Ronald Reagan’s 1982 Caribbean Basin Initiative message.

Book recs: 

On migrants: Martinez’ The Beast: Riding the Rails and Dodging Narcos on the Migrant Trail.

… and for clothing-trade background: (as with Martinez’ book, slightly dated but still full of insights), Pietra Rivoli’s Travels of a T-shirt in the Global Economy (2005).

Data:

Customs and Border Patrol tabulate border ‘encounters’.

Clothing and textile import data in various forms from the Commerce Department’s Office of Textiles and Apparel.

The CAFTA/DR:

Full agreement text for CAFTA/DR; see Chapter 4, Annex 4.1 and “Textiles Amendment” for clothing rules.

An alternative clothing-import table:

The chart at the top counts from the signature of CAFTA/DR in 2005. A more recent count, looking at the decade 2012 to 2022 would be somewhat different, with China down rather than up, Vietnam and Bangladesh getting almost 2/3 of all new imports, and slightly higher growth for the CAFTA/DR countries. Same table, though a bit shorter:

World	+$23.6 billion
Vietnam	+$11.3 billion
Bangladesh	+$5.3 billion
India	+$2.8 billion
CAFTA/DR	+$2.7 billion*
Cambodia	+$2.0 billion
Pakistan	+$1.4 billion
Jordan	+$1.0 billion
Italy	+$1.0 billion
Sri Lanka	+$0.7 billion
Indonesia	+$0.7 billion
Turkey	+$0.7 billion
Egypt	+$0.5 billion
Haiti	+$0.6 billion
Peru	+$0.4 billion
Madagascar	+$0.4 billion
Burma	+$0.4 billion
Kenya	+$0.3 billion
Ethiopia	+$0.3 billion
Colombia	+$0.1 billion
Mexico	-$0.2 billion
China	-$8.4 billion

*Within CAFTA/DR, totals are Nicaragua +$1.4 billion, Guatemala +$0.7 billion, Honduras +$0.6 billion, El Salvador +$0.1billion, Dominican Republic unchanged, Costa Rica -$0.2 billion.

 

 

 

 

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

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FACT: Korea, the world’s most robotic country.

THE NUMBERS: Robot installations, 2021* –

“Industrial”                       517,000
  Electronics                    136,000
Automotive                   121,000
All other                        260,000
Specialized services        121,000
“Consumer”                     19 million

* International Federation of Robotics, 11/22

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Reporting from Guangzhou last November, Reuters finds Chinese workers losing interest in manufacturing work:

“More than 80% of Chinese manufacturers faced labor shortages ranging from hundreds to thousands of workers this year, equivalent to 10% to 30% of their workforce, a survey by CIIC Consulting showed. China’s Ministry of Education forecasts a shortage of nearly 30 million manufacturing workers by 2025.”

The article’s young blue-collar Chinese interlocutors now prefer additional education or finding jobs in services (and a startlingly large number, Reuters also says, are “adopting a minimal lifestyle known as ‘lying flat,’ doing just enough to get by and rejecting the rat race of China Inc.”) China’s factories seem, however, to be adapting – in part by trying to offer higher wages, but also by hiring metal and plastic stand-ins. The International Federation of Robotics’ annual snapshot of the robot universe, World Robotics 2022, reports that over half of last year’s 517,385 newly employed industrial robots last year went to work in China, and that Chinese factories are now more robot-heavy than America’s:

“Every other robot globally installed in 2021 ended up in China: Installations surged by 51% to 268,195 units.”  

On a broader scale, IFR’s report divides the new-robot picture into three parts:

Industrial robots: Last year’s Chinese robot surge was unusually large, but also reflects a trend sustained over the past decade. China is now by far the world’s top industrial-robot employer, home to 1.22 million working factory robots, or over a third of the world’s 3.48 million total. A contributor to this is the shifting industry-sector balance of robot use: auto plants (especially in the U.S., Japan, Korea, and Germany) were the first and historically the largest employers of robots, but have been surpassed at least in raw numbers by the electronics industry.

By this total count, China is the world’s robot metropolis. A different perspective — the ratio of robots to human workers — finds neighboring Korea easily eclipsing even China’s mighty robot army. The Korean government reports exactly 1,000 robots for every 10,000 Korean factory workers, far ahead of second-place Singapore’s 670 robots per 10,000 factory workers. After them comes Japan at 399 and Germany at 397; China is sixth at 322; and Taiwan and the U.S. essentially tie for eighth at 276 and 274 respectively. (The world average is 141.)  Japan, finally, is likely the industrial-robot production center; though this year’s report doesn’t have a figure, last year’s cited Japan as producing 45% of industrial robots.

Specialized services robots: Robot services professionals are fewer in numbers than their proletarian factory cousins — 121,000 new ones last year, about a quarter of the 517,000 new industrials — and (like the human “services sector”) are very diverse. The largest group, 49,500, went to work in logistics, carrying packages in warehouses and delivery centers, and moving industrial components through factories. Another 20,000 took “hospitality” jobs, such as ferrying food from kitchen to table in large restaurants* or greeting customers; 14,800 went to work in hospitals, clinics, or emergency medical services, 12,600 in industrial cleaning work, and about 8,000 in farms, dairy, and ranching. IFR’s report regrettably doesn’t have figures on the countries in which these high-skill robots are lighting up, but notes that (in some contrast to the industrial-robot world, where Japan is the largest producer and neighbors Korea and China the leading users), the U.S. is the largest services-robot manufacturer.

Homes: Finally, 19 million humble domestic robots went to work in homes, mainly for interior cleaning and vacuuming, but also for lawn-mowing.

* The Trade Fact series editor encountered two attentive and polite restaurant robots at a restaurant in Chiang Rai in the northern reaches of Thailand in February. Thai industrial-robot installation rose by 36% last year, to about 4,000.

 

FURTHER READING:

Chinese workers not so interested in factory jobs.

… but no worries, here are the metal and plastic replacements. Global highlights from the International Federation of Robotics’ World Robotics 2021.

… and IFR’s closer looks at industrial and services robots.

The New York-based Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers has a weekly new-robot video. Try the prototype seabed-cleaning jellyfish-robot.

… and also has a sentimental look back at Unimate, the first operating industrial robot (1961, GM plant, New Jersey).

Industry and research international: 

Most roboticized country: The Korean Association of Robot Industry.

Largest producer: The Robotics Society of Japan.

This one may not pan out: Thai gourmets develop a robot for verifying ingredient-authenticity, aroma, and general tastiness of tom yam.

A 17-point robotics and application plan from China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

Singapore has a robot-police patrol dedicated to scolding people.

A few looks ahead, and one look back, from robot arts and lit:

Capek’s R.U.R. (1921) invented the word “robot,” and the classic “robot uprising” plot. The title acronym stands for a fictional “Rossum’s Universal Robots” company, with “Rossum” a slightly modified version of the Czech word for “reason,” and “robot” likewise an adapted term for “worker.” A Penn State robotics academic looks at R.U.R. a century later.

In robot-friendly Japan, by contrast, Astro-Boy (said to be the first anime character) is a helpful friend to humanity.

Stanislaw Lem’s “Mortal Engines” collection speculates about machine intelligence. In “The Hunt”, a well-meaning human pilot volunteers to destroy a supposedly mad robot; next, in “Mask,” a troubled, self-aware female robot-assassin tracks down a political dissident.

Philip K. Dick thought humans and robots would lose the ability to distinguish themselves from one another.

And Adrienne Mayer’s Gods and Robots: Myths, Machines, and Ancient Dreams of Technology takes the long look back, at visions of androids, flying cars, computers, and other semi-inventions in classical Greece, with comparators from India, Babylon, and the mechanical men of the Qin Dynasty court.

 

 

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

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FACT: U.S. Customs seizes 75 shipments of counterfeit goods imports each day.

THE NUMBERS: Counterfeit goods seizures by U.S. Customs* –

FY2021 value             $3.3 billion
Number of seizures    27,115

FY2016 value             $1.4 billion
Number of seizures    31,560

FY 2011 value            $1.1 billion
Number of seizures    24,792

* CBP data; “value” is at the “Manufacturers Suggested Retail Price” of an authentic item.

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Here’s fashion magazine Allure with a closeup on the criminal fringe of the global manufacturing economy, through the lens of a 2016 seizure of counterfeit perfume in New York:

“Five men have been arrested in New York by U.S. Immigration and Customs (ICE) for knowingly selling counterfeit designer perfumes made with ingredients including antifreeze and urine across at least seven states … The authorities reportedly recovered approximately 10,000 boxes of the faux scents, whose ingredients included the aforementioned urine and antifreeze along with ‘other unpleasant, flammable, or dangerous chemicals that burn when applied to the skin.’ ”  

Background: The most recent big-picture study of trade in counterfeits, a 2021 report from the OECD, estimated an upper limit of $464 billion worth of counterfeit goods flowing across borders in 2019.  This would have been 2.5% of that year’s $19.8 trillion in goods exports — not much different from the 3.3% counterfeit share they estimated for 2016 and the same as their 2.5% estimate for 2013. By the OECD’s account, 90% of counterfeit goods come from five places — China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates — and the most frequently counterfeited products include shoes, clothes, perfumes and cosmetics (making Allure‘s New York arrest story a pretty representative case), along with watches and leather products like luggage and handbags.

U.S. counterfeit seizure statistics likewise seem to show a fairly stable level of counterfeit trade (or at least of interdictions of counterfeit goods) over the past decade, after a sharp rise in the 2000s. CBP’s FY2011 report tallied 24,792 seizures of counterfeit shipments (about 70 each day), and the 2016 report noted a higher total, at nearly 32,000.  The 2021 total, at 27,115 seizures, was in between. Three ways to look at these totals:

(a) Number and kind of products: The 27,115 seizures in 2021 in turn brought in over 115,000 different “lines” of products, which reflect OECD’s report on the most frequently counterfeited goods fairly well: 73,367 seizures of counterfeit designer clothes, shoes, and luggage; 3,155 of personal products like the counterfeit perfumes, medicines, and medical products (including, in that troubled year, 35 million substandard masks and 38,154 useless or dangerous faux-COVID test kits); 5,380 sets of consumer electronics items, and 1,083 shipments of aircraft and auto parts.

(b) Origins: Here the U.S. statistics slightly differ from those of the OECD.  As with OECD, they report China and Hong Kong as the top sources, accounting for 51,787 of the 115,000 “lines” of counterfeit goods, and also have Turkey in third with 10,781 lines.  The remaining two are the Philippines with 6,416, and Colombia with 5,912.

(c) Transport methods: Counterfeit goods most frequently travel to the U.S. (assuming that CBP’s seizure statistics more or less accurately reflect the counterfeiting industry’s logistics choices) by express deliveries and mail shipments. CBP’s figures show 16,926 of the seized shipments arriving via express delivery, while 7,293 arrived by mail, 2,274 by maritime cargo, and 622 by unspecified other methods. The maritime cargo seizures, however, were apparently very large and valuable; weighted towards consumer electronics counterfeits, they accounted for $1.5 billion or half the total value of all seizures.

The amount of counterfeit goods which get all the way to consumers is by nature uncertain. The CDC, looking closely at medicine, says that “in high-income countries, such as the United States, less than 1% of medicines sold are counterfeit.” Medicines, though, are presumably an area where providers are especially cautious and law enforcement especially vigilant.  CBP’s advice to consumers (and the message implicit in Allure’s graphic description of counterfeit perfume ingredients), though, is to be careful with what you buy: “Counterfeit products are low quality and can cause injuries or even death when used.”

 

 

FURTHER READING:

Ewww – Allure (2016) on the gross ingredients and nasty side-effects of counterfeit perfume.

… and a similar report this week from CBP, on a seizure of 150 parcels containing 744 counterfeit Botox shipments this Monday in Louisville.

CBP’s one-page, three-point guide for consumer awareness.

CBP explains policy in Finance Committee testimony (2018).

… and from the U.S. Trade Representative Office, this morning’s “Special 301” report on intellectual property reviews counterfeiting law and enforcement on pp. 16-20.

U.S. seizure data: 

The Customs Service’s annual reports on counterfeit seizures, by country and type of good, back to FY2003.  Seizure counts rise steadily from the 5,973 of FY2003 to 14,675 in FY2007 and 19,959 in FY 2010, peak at above 31,000 in FYs 2016, 2017, and 2018, and then drop back a bit to the 27,115 of FY2002.  Next update likely in September.

And direct to last year’s figures.

World picture:

OECD on the $461 billion world of counterfeit trade as of 2019.

… and also from OECD, a close-up of counterfeiting in perfumes, cosmetics, and other especially risky products.

Medicine closeup:

The Food and Drug Administration on counterfeit medicine risks in the United States.

… and CDC guidance for buying medicine abroad.

And the World Health Organization’s home-page for counterfeit medicine.

And beyond the borders: 

Wealthy countries with sophisticated and efficient customs enforcement record most seizures of counterfeit goods; in lower-income regions, seizures are less systematic and counterfeits are much more likely to reach consumers. As an example, the UN’s Office of Crime and Drug Control reports that substandard or counterfeit medicine rates are above 40% in eight countries — Venezuela, Suriname, Mali, Ghana, Malawi, Nepal, Bhutan, and Vietnam — and between 20% and 39% in 15 more.  They published estimates this spring that these counterfeits contribute to as many as 267,000 annual deaths from malaria, and 169,000 deaths from childhood pneumonia. UNODC’s examination of counterfeit medicine in Africa, with a closeup on especially vulnerable low-income Sahelian states.

 

 

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week