Focusing on the Correct Broadband Issues

The U.S. has undertaken a two-pronged effort to close the broadband digital divide. COVID-era legislation such as the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) Program is providing tens of billions to wire up unserved areas. And the Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) provides a subsidy that effectively makes broadband free for as many as 50 million eligible households, based on an analysis of pre-pandemic data. The eligibility criteria are broad, encompassing any household with incomes at or below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines, or participation in any one of a long list of assistance programs, including Pell Grants and Medicaid.

With this sort of focused effort on providing affordable connectivity to everyone, what could go wrong? Some groups have alleged that the broadband industry is still discriminating against poor neighborhoods. Their core claim is that wealthier neighborhoods attract multiple broadband providers, and therefore the government should pay to build multiple networks in poor neighborhoods to create more competition.

For example, a recent study by the California Community Foundation and Digital Equity LA asserts that, within Los Angeles County, the price of high-speed internet is lower in higher-income areas, leaving poorer neighborhoods paying more for access. The claim is that wealthier neighborhoods reap the benefits of competition.

However, the study, while addressing an important issue, suffers from problems  almost too numerous to mention. First, the study is based on only 165 non-randomly chosen residential addresses in LA County, which has more than 3 million households. Second, any disparities in advertised pricing are irrelevant, since with the ACP funding, those most in need of financial assistance can get broadband at effectively zero monthly cost. Third, the preferred solution in the study — to “support independent, community-driven options for internet service” — sounds great until you realize how much money it would cost to lay an additional broadband network in Los Angeles. Indeed, operating a broadband network is an expensive and risky activity: Starry, an independent provider of broadband services in five cities, just filed for bankruptcy.

But the biggest issue with the study is that it is conceptually misguided. With funding in the pipeline for network expansion, and the ACP subsidies widely available, it’s become clear that getting people to sign up for “costless” internet is the major remaining problem to closing the broadband equity gap — the so-called adoption gap.

There’s plenty of evidence that much of the adoption gap is not tied to price. As we noted in our October 2022 blog post, the latest NTIA Internet Use Survey (collected in November 2021, before the ACP became active) showed that only 18% of households without internet access at home cited cost as a reason for being offline. In the NTIA survey, 58% of the offline households “express no interest or need to be online.”

How can the adoption gap be closed? First, building expensive new networks in areas that already have high-speed broadband, like Los Angeles County, is not the way to go. That money could be better spent on extending funding for the ACP.

Instead, we need programs to improve digital literacy and show, step-by-step, how to get online and utilize government and private resources. The Biden Administration has pointed to education efforts as being one of the main drivers of enrollment in ACP, with examples such as a text being sent out to 1.3 million likely eligible households in the state of Michigan resulting in 25,000 additional enrollments, or 1 million SNAP and TANF beneficiaries in Massachusetts being notified about the program resulting in enrollment doubling over just the next 5 days. This kind of effort is not new in LA County where in December 2021, the County launched an outreach campaign for ACP’s predecessor program which generated over 40,000 sign-ups in one month. More recently, numerous LA-based organizations, including the County itself, received modest grants from the FCC’s ACP Outreach Grant Program. Building on these investments and leveraging outreach via multiple organizations will help educate consumers on the benefits of broadband and drive adoption of service.  Continued education efforts are the key to maintaining this momentum.

But by themselves, such programs are not enough since adoption is driven by financial inclusion as well. Without a credit card or a bank account, it’s much harder to use online services such as e-commerce and ride-sharing. Indeed, it’s possible that the people who express no interest in being online are actually responding to these other obstacles. Data show that 4.5% of the U.S. population currently has no access to the financial system, and an additional 14% are “underbanked,” meaning they primarily rely on nonbank transactions. For these households, which include some of those most in need of financial assistance, this acts as an additional barrier to obtaining connectivity.

It’s true that high-speed internet is a sort of prerequisite to participate in today’s society, but if cost is not the barrier for consumers, as is the case with current subsidy programs, examining pricing diverts attention away from the real barriers. In order to fully close the digital divide, the question of internet adoption is what must be addressed by communities and policymakers.

Pankovits for Medium: New Jersey Governor Heeds Parents’ Voices; More Democrats Should Follow His Lead

By Tressa Pankovits

Maybe it’s because New Jersey voters support public charter schools by a 2:1 margin. Maybe it’s because of achievement data. Maybe he’s moderating his positions in advance of a potential presidential run. Or, maybe he’s finally listening to frustrated parents. Regardless, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy recently took a softer line on public charter schools by allowing 11 in his state to expand to accommodate wait-listed students. We applaud his decision and encourage other Democrats to follow his lead.

Charter schools are free, open enrollment public schools that operate outside of traditional school district bureaucracies. In many states, they are concentrated in cities where most parents cannot afford private school tuition if their assigned district school is lacking.

Parents love them because they generally get better results than district schools operating in poor, urban environments. For example, Camden is New Jersey’s poorest city by most measures. On the first state assessments since the pandemic began, 52.9% of Camden’s charter school students were meeting or approaching English Language Arts (ELA) state standards in the fall of 2021. On the same test, only 35.5% of traditional public school students met or approached the ELA standard. Math was even tougher for Camden’s students, but again, public charter school students outperformed their traditional school counterparts at 29.5% to just 13.7% in meeting or approaching state standards.

Read more in Medium.

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: ‘Total column ozone counts’ are rising

FACT: ‘Total column ozone counts’ are rising

THE NUMBERS: World ozone-depleting substance consumption* –
1989             
1.32 million tons
2005             
0.25 million tons
2010             
0.10 million tons
2015             
0.01 million tons?
* Includes chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, methyl bromide, carbon tetrachloride, halons, and methyl chloroform. (Our World in Data)

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Here is a success story:

Chlorofluorocarbons, known for pronunciation’s sake as “CFCs,” are strings of carbon atoms joined with the halide elements fluorine and chlorine rather than their more common hydrogen-ion partners. First synthesized in 1928 by American refrigerator-makers, they were used worldwide as coolants and industrial solvents from the 1930s to the 1990s by manufacturers, building superintendents, food-service professionals, and home-owners, all of them unaware that CFCs react easily with ozone, and that this, in turn, could have large consequences.

Via eleventh-grade chemistry, meanwhile, ozone is a pungent form of oxygen arranged chemically as “O3,” as distinct from breathable oxygen “O2.” Floating in a “layer” 15-35 kilometers above the earth, ozone absorbs ultraviolet light and in doing so reduces the risk of skin cancer to people, cools lower-atmosphere temperatures, and facilitates photosynthesis in land plants and oceanic phytoplankton. CFCs are fairly stable molecules that float around for a long time — depending on the particular molecule, they can last from 100 to 200 years before breaking up and raining down out of the sky — and react quickly with ozone.  Thus their release from buildings and refrigerators began an era of high-atmosphere chemical reactions, which scientists predicted in the 1970s and then detected as a fall in the atmosphere’s “total column ozone” count by 1985. This eased ultraviolet light passage to the earth, with especially large effects over Antarctica where a large “hole” of missing ozone appeared in the early 1980s, first at about 5 million square km and reaching 28 million square km by 2000.

How to respond? The Montreal Protocol, a monument of Reagan-administration and international environmental diplomacy, banned the production and use of CFCs in 1987, and has since been ratified and implemented by 196 countries and territories.  Over the ensuing 35 years, production and industrial consumption of CFCs has dropped by about 100%, from 1.1 million tons in 1986 to 43,000 tons in 2005, then to a tiny 63 tons in 2010, and since then oscillating around zero.  (“About 100%” and “oscillating” because sometimes discovery and destruction of unused CFC stocks create a negative output; alternatively, sometimes destruction of old buildings inadvertently releases old “banks” of CFC-containing insulation for a small positive output.)

The “Kigali Amendment” negotiated under the Obama administration in 2016 added a ban on hydrofluorocarbons — a temporary replacement for CFCs which are less potent ozone-depleters but have strong greenhouse effects — and made the sale of the next generation of chemicals conditional on participation.  This went into effect in 2019, with Senate ratification last fall. The HFCs are supposed to be gone by 2030.

Two results of all this:

(1) CFC atmospheric concentration down: Near zero in 1920, the level of chlorine in the Antarctic stratosphere hit 2.2 parts per billion in 1980 and peaked at 4.7 parts per billion in the mid-1990s.  Since then it has been falling by 0.4% to 0.8% per year, with NOAA charts showing “CFC-11” down from 540 points per trillion to 490 ppt since the late 1990s, “CFC-12” from 270 ppt to 220 ppt, and “CFC-113” from 84 ppt to 68 ppt.  The current CFC level is about 3.5 parts per billion, and though CFCs degrade only slowly, NOAA’s projections show a return to 1980 levels by the 2070s.

(2) Ozone layer slowly recovering: As CFC levels drop, ozone levels have stabilized.  UNEP believes “total column ozone” is rising by about 1% to 3% per year, and the “ozone hole” above Antarctica now oscillates in a range between 16 million square km in 2019 and 24.5 million square km in 2022. The UN Environmental Programme’s 2022 ozone assessment tentatively projects that atmospheric ozone will return to its 1980 levels sometime around the year 2040 worldwide, and in the 2060s for the Antarctic. The reduced emissions of CFC and related gases, meanwhile, appear to have averted a rise of 0.5 to 1 degree Celsius in average global temperatures; and the Kigali Amendment is likely to prevent another 0.5-degree rise.

So altogether: With good scientific evidence, commitment by governments of quite different political outlooks, implementation by bureaucracies and businesses, and some modest temporary sacrifice for the common good, policy can achieve a lot.

 

FURTHER READING:

Then – 

From Ronald Reagan’s enthusiastic comments on the Montreal Protocol in April 1988:

“The Montreal protocol is a model of cooperation. It is a product of the recognition and international consensus that ozone depletion is a global problem, both in terms of its causes and its effects. The protocol is the result of an extraordinary process of scientific study, negotiations among representatives of the business and environmental communities, and of international diplomacy.  It is a monumental achievement.” 

Full text from the Reagan Library

35 years later, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency explains ozone-depletion chemistry

And in 2016, President Obama announces the Kigali Amendment

Now –

NOAA on the state of the ozone

Nairobi-based UN Environmental Programme oversees the Montreal Protocol and explains the laws and obligations

Smithsonian Institution studies ultraviolet effects on phytoplankton (and thus on photosynthesis and a large oceanic carbon sink)

MIT analysts track down CFC banks, with up to 2.1 million tons of CFC still stored

And NASA’s ‘ozone watch’ tracks ozone density (as measured in Dobson Units) over the South Pole

 

 

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week

Butler for The 74: To Retain the Support of Black Voters, Democrats Must Re-Embrace Charter Schools

By Markose Butler

The education of school children has long been a contentious issue in American politics. At its heart, its purpose is to prepare young people for the future. Parents, elected officials and communities grapple with how to best to do this, how and where schools should be built and how to fund them. Unfortunately, the legacy of segregation, white flight and the hollowing out of urban communities has left many low-income Black students stuck in poor, underperforming schools that don’t prepare them for the future.

Politicians of both parties have made a lot of hay about the state of inner-city and majority Black schools. As the party that largely controls many large urban centers, and overwhelmingly wins the African American vote, Democrats politically own the outcomes in most of these jurisdictions.

The Democratic Party has pushed to increase funding for low-income schools, aiming to solve a perceived lack of funding equity. However, the districts with the most income and racial segregation actually tend to spend more on low-income and minority schools than on wealthier, typically white-dominated ones.

Read more in the 74.

Ritz for Forbes: The Biden Budget’s Medicare Mirage

By Ben Ritz

President Biden has used his budget proposal to Congress to position himself as a champion of Medicare and Social Security. Even before the budget’s official release, Biden took to the guest essay pages of the New York Times to outline his plans to tackle Medicare’s looming insolvency.

It’s good that the administration is at least acknowledging the need for action to shore up the finances of these vital social insurance programs and has offered a few concrete proposals to do so. But the specifics of his plan are both convoluted and problematic, and the large shortfalls that would remain even if the president could enact his policy wishlist make clear the need for policymakers to consider a much broader menu of options.

Biden’s Medicare proposals are largely limited to increasing revenue for the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund, which finances Part A benefits (hospital services, nursing facilities, home health assistance, and hospice care) and is projected to run out of money in just five years. If no action is taken before then, payments would be limited to what can be financed by incoming revenue, resulting in an automatic spending cut of roughly 10%. The Biden budget would increase the dedicated taxes that finance Part A by about 30% — but only for people with annual incomes over $400,000. This is a real revenue increase that would delay the trust fund’s insolvency by several years.

Read more in Forbes.

Johnson for The USA Today Network: Joe Biden should stay above the populist anti-tech fray. This is why

By Jeremiah Johnson

With his anti-innovation comments in the State of the Union, President Joe Biden officially joined the short-sighted, anti-tech fray, calling on lawmakers to pass the deceptively named American Innovation and Choice Online Act. That is the last thing America needs right now.

Conservatives and progressives that support this kind of legislation remain ready to take the populist hammer to America’s biggest tech companies, with little regard for the long-term consequences. Each has their own seemingly separate reasons, but many of these can be traced back to political vendettas. And for what? Do we really want to risk America’s national and economic security to settle a grudge?

Read more in The USA Today Network

How the Economics and Regulation of Mobile Platforms Affects Japan’s Digital Transformation and Cybersecurity

Section 1. Introduction

In 2018, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) published the “Digital Transformation (DX)” report, warning the Japanese economy would suffer from massively slower growth without increased investment in IT hardware and software. Moreover, Japanese companies were encouraged to place a greater emphasis on digital business models. A series of follow- up reports, notably DX Report 2.1, identified four different strategies companies can employ toward transforming to create a digital industry.

More recently, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has described his vision of a Digital Garden City Nation, where investment in innovative digital technologies would help revitalize regional economies. This includes implementing digital services to solve rural issues.

An essential aspect of digital transformation and innovation is the heavy use of mobile platforms and apps to provide these digital services to users. Mobile apps are essential for the digital transformation of industries such as healthcare, manufacturing, agriculture, energy, and transportation. For example, the digital transformation of health care requires linking doctors, nurses, and other health care professionals wirelessly with patients and with electronic health records. Digital transformation of agriculture requires the use of precision wireless sensors and mobile apps to allow farmers to monitor conditions in the fields for optimal productivity. Digital transformation of manufacturing requires mobile apps that allow factory workers to monitor robots and sophisticated machinery.

How important are mobile apps and mobile platforms for digital transformation and innovation? By PPI’s analysis, roughly 25% of the help-wanted ads for tech workers in Japan mention the need for App Economy skills such as knowledge of the iOS or Android mobile operating systems. That suggests that Japanese employers see a strong need for workers who have the ability to develop and maintain mobile applications.

Indeed, the current mobile application ecosystems, built around the iOS and Android operating systems and the mobile app stores, can provide a good role model for overall digital transformations. These ecosystems have proven successful over the past 15 years in accelerating innovation and encouraging the development of new applications. First, the mobile application ecosystems provide low-cost distribution services for small- and medium-size app developers that they cannot provide themselves. Second, while the iOS and Android ecosystems take somewhat different approaches, the current mobile app stores devote large amounts of technological and human resources to screening out malware and enforcing security standards. The result is that users are willing to download and adopt innovative apps.

Given the effectiveness of the current system in encouraging innovation, this paper addresses the question of whether new regulations now being considered for mobile app stores have a negative impact on security and business activities, with the potential to delay or hinder the digital transformation of the Japanese economy. The problem is that regulators may accidentally undermine the very features of the app stores that make them so effective at encouraging innovation. In particular, regulations that mandate sideloading make it more difficult for the existing app stores to screen for malware and other security issues can lead users to be less trusting of innovative new applications that might control their homes, their cars, their medical devices, and their factories.

Already, Japanese government websites have come under attack by Russian hackers. National security considerations suggest that the security of the mobile application ecosystem should be a high priority for regulators. Less effective screening of new apps, if mandated by government regulators, will also make the digital transformation of the Japanese government more difficult.

In section 2, “The App Store Ecosystem and Digital Transformation (DX),” we show how app innovation is essential to Japan’s digital transformation (DX). In particular, mobile apps are essential for allowing users to interact with enterprise-level IT systems.

In section 3, “Quantifying the Economic Importance of the App Store Ecosystem for Digital Transformation and Innovation,” we estimate the contribution of the app store ecosystem to digital transformation. As noted earlier we find that roughly 25% of tech job postings in Japan require app economy skills. Our methodology is described in the Appendix to the paper.

In section 4, “The Economic Link Between Innovation and a Secure App Store Ecosystem,” we show that developers and consumers both benefit from a secure app store ecosystem. The ability of users to download new apps in safety has fostered innovation, and the expansion of app markets, which in turn had fed back to more innovation.

In section 5, “Allowing Sideloading and Other New App Store Regulations May Hinder Digital Transformation,” we show how new app store regulations can reduce security
and hurt developers and users. The result, from an economic perspective, will be to hinder the process of digital transformation.

In section 6, “Why the European model of tech regulation doesn’t work in Japan,” we discuss the European model of tech regulation, and show how it has led to slower productivity growth and less innovation. This has important implications for Japan, which has been considering an even stricter version of the European approach.

 

Read the full report in English and Japanese

Child Care, It’s a Workforce Issue!

In this episode of the Radically Pragmatic podcast, PPI’s Taylor Maag, the Director of Workforce Development Policy speaks with national and state leaders, Linda Smith from the Bipartisan Policy Center and Ashli Watts from the Kentucky Chamber on child care policy in our nation, how it is affecting women in the workforce and bold new solutions to address child care challenges at scale.

Follow Taylor on Twitter here.

Learn more about the New Skills for a New Economy here.

Learn more about the Progressive Policy Institute here.

Marshall for The Hill: Democrats’ Big Test on Crime

By Will Marshall

 

What to do about an upsurge in violent crime has become a burning issue in America’s deep blue urban centers. That’s why Democrats are riveted on the April 4 runoff election that will pick Chicago’s next mayor.

It’s a duel between two Democrats with strikingly different outlooks on law and order. The outcome will go far to determine whether their party will rebuild its credibility on public safety or continue to let Republicans enjoy an unearned advantage on a potent issue.

Read more in The Hill.

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: Southeast Asians work the longest hours

FACT: Southeast Asians work the longest hours.

THE NUMBERS: Countries with the longest and shortest known working years*

2017                 Cambodia, 2,456 hours; Germany, 1,354 hours
2000                South Korea, 2509 hours; Germany, 1,452 hours            
1980                 South Korea, 2,864 hours; Sweden, 1,517 hours
1950                 Chile, 2,678 hours             
1929                 United States, 2316 hours
1900                 France, 3,115 hours
1870                 Belgium, 3,483 hours; U.K., 2,976 hours

* Our World in Data. Note that data (a) is available for 70 countries in 2017 and fewer in earlier years, (b) covers “non-agricultural workers,” so is less dependable for countries with large rural/farming populations, and (c) applies to formal-sector workers for whom data is reported and available, and misses sometimes very large informal-sector workforces.


WHAT THEY MEAN:

The Washington Post reports on an unusual proposal from the Korean Labor Ministry:

“South Korea’s conservative government has proposed increasing the legal cap on weekly work hours from 52 to 69 … South Koreans already toil more than many of their overseas counterparts. They work an average of 1,915 hours a year, compared with 1,791 hours for Americans and 1,490 hours for the French, who have a 35-hour workweek, according to figures from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD average is 1,716 hours.”

Comparisons like these are a bit fraught. The OECD, whose data covers 44 middle- and upper-income countries plus averages for the EU and the OECD membership, very responsibly warns that its “data are intended for comparisons of trends over time; they are unsuitable for comparisons of the level of average annual hours of work for a given year, because of differences in their sources and method of calculation.” Broader attempts to add low-income country data (for example the 70-country table published by Our World in Data) are even riskier, (a) low-income country statistical agencies may be less accurate; (b) coverage of informal-sector workers in low- and middle-income countries will be either much spottier than formal-sector work or nonexistent; and these surveys typically exclude farm labor, whose share of total jobs is low in high-income regions but often high in low-income countries. All these cautions noted, the available figures do suggest a couple of conclusions:

1. Southeast Asians spend the most time on the job. Our World in Data, whose figures go through 2017, reports that Cambodians — garment-workers in Phnom Penh, hotel maids and concierges around Siem Reap, truckers, and crane operators on the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville run – spent an average of 2,456 hours on the job that year.* Also in Our World’s top six: Myanmar at 2,438 hours per year, Malaysia and Singapore at 2,238 hours each, and Bangladesh (“South Asian” by geographic convention but in the same neighborhood) at 2,232 hours.  The non-Asian representative in the longest-hour tier is Mexico, at 2,255 hours per year. ASEAN generally is a long-hour region: Thai workers rank 10th in the Our World table with 2,185 hours per year, Vietnam and the Philippines 12th and 13th, and Indonesia 19th with 2,024. To the west and north, India and Pakistan clock in at about 2,100 hours each, with China at a slightly higher 2,174 hours.

2. Europeans spend the least time on the job: Relaxed but efficient Europeans show up at the bottom-hour tiers of all three surveys.  Defying all stereotypes, Germans work the fewest hours, at 1,354 per year in Our World’s 2017 table, and 1,349 hours in OECD’s 2021 figures. This is the equivalent of 38 five-day weeks, assuming 8-hour days, with 14 weeks off. Just above the Germans come Danes, Luxembourgers, Dutch, Norwegians, Icelanders, Austrians, Swedes, and French, all working less than 1,500 hours per year.  EU workers score well on productivity figures, though, so they get a lot done in their limited office/plant/lab/shop time. Americans are pretty near a hypothetical world average (1,757 working hours by Our World’s count and 1,791 hours according to the OECD) with Japan’s 1,738 hours and Australia’s 1,731 about the same. The longest high-income work years turn up in the Baltic states and Taiwan at nearly 2,000 hours each — 30 8-hour days more than Americans — with Hong Kong’s 2,186 hours and Singapore’s 2,238 hours the high-income world’s longest working years.

3. Over time, people work less: In the very big picture, even the world’s highest work-hour totals look modest when matched against those of earlier times. The Our World database includes 11 countries whose labor ministries were able to estimate annual work hours in 1870. All reported over 3,000 hours a year on the job, with Belgium’s 3,455 hours — essentially a ten-hour day, every day with a couple of holidays and no weekends off — looking like the longest year ever measured. The U.K.’s 2,755 hours, the lowest in the 1870 records, is still 300 hours more than Cambodia’s modern estimate.  National holidays, 8-hour-day laws, overtime pay rules, and similar legal and regulatory changes brought these remarkable totals down through much of the 20th century. In the U.S.’ case, the 3,096-hour work year of 1870 fell to 2,605 hours by 1913. In 1950, 15 years after the Fair Labor Standards Act, the work year was just above 2,000 hours.

4. No clear recent pattern: Using a more relatable time frame — say, the last generation’s experience since 1990 or 2000 — no clear pattern appears. The U.S.’ total hasn’t changed much — 1,796 hours in 1990, a bump up to 1,845 in 2000, and 1,796 in 2021. On the other hand, work years have lengthened in much of Asia and parts of Latin America — up by 30 to 84 hours in India, Colombia, Cambodia, the Philippines, China, and Indonesia. Elsewhere, though, Thai workers have cut their 2500-hour year by 310 hours since 2000, Taiwanese by 190 hours, Irish by 187 hours, and Chileans and Costa Ricans by 289 and 155. And as the Korean economy has evolved from a heavy-industry center to a services-and-tech “Hallyu Wave” [link: https://www.progressivepolicy.org/blogs/ppis-trade-fact-of-the-week-squid-game-outdrew-the-world-series-this-year-nov-17-2021/], its working year has fallen by a full 600 hours: 2,677 hours in 1990, 2,509 in 2000, 2,063 in 2017, and most recently 1,909 in 2021.  This is still a bit long by high-income country standards, but represents a drop of 600 hours, or 75 8-hour days, in a single generation. Perhaps this suggests why senior Labor Ministry bureaucrats, remembering their weekend-less youth, may feel that 69 hours a week isn’t too much to ask?

* As an example, the 2,456-hour average may reflect the experience of a very limited fraction of Cambodian workers, as ILO figures show 92% of Cambodians are in informal work, and World Bank data report that 75% of Cambodians live in rural areas.  

 

FURTHER READING:

Data and comparisons:
OECD’s working hour data for 44 countries, the EU as a whole, and the OECD membership averages

Our World in Data with working hours per worker in 1870, 1900, 1913, 1929, 1938, and 1951 (for selected countries), and 1980-2017 for 70 countries

The Conference Board has 2021 data for 41 countries (Americas, Europe, wealthy Asia) in table 9, under “Labor Productivity and Per Capita Income Levels and the Effects of Working Hours and Labor Utilization, 2021”

And the International Labor Organization’s working-hour database

The U.S. Geological Survey’s mineral commodity statistics, covering steel, aluminum, and 130 other substantives from abrasives, aggregates, and aluminum to yttrium and zirconium, with salt, pumice through steel, aluminum, rare earth elements, cement, gold, iridium/osmium/platinum, gemstones, tin, and more.

Korea:
WP’s Andrew Jeong (subs. req.) on work-hour law in Korea

The Labor and Employment Ministry isn’t saying much (at least on its English-language page)

And PPI’s Lisa Ly looks at Squid Game, K-pop, and the “Hallyu Wave” economy

Elsewhere:
Germany’s Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs regulates the shortest working year in the world

Singapore’s Ministry of Manpower (under the maternal-sounding “mom.gov.sg”) handles the wealthy world’s longest working year

Cambodia’s Labor Ministry

… and Cambodia’s Better Factories program, an ILO-launched system operating since 1999, offers independent inspection for hours, union rights, sexual harassment, and other labor rights standards for garment workers in 557 factories

The U.S.’ Department of Labor on work-hours, overtime, holidays and vacation, and more

And for those with some extra time:
Juliet Schor’s The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure (1993) wonders why, somewhere in the late 1970s, American workers stopped demanding more time off

 

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week

Weighing the risks of right to repair for consumer tech products

Who has the “right to repair” a product after it’s been purchased? The intuitive answer would be the person or business that purchased it, but in the case of products with sophisticated technology and software — an increasingly common characteristic for just about any product — this becomes more complicated. In these cases, repairs likely require specialized equipment or software programs from the manufacturers, which in turn runs a higher risk of exposing trade secrets or reducing the security built into the product by requiring backdoor entry for repairs or diagnostics.

Legislators have grappled with trying to find this balance for some time. For example, take the case of cars, which now have complex onboard computers. Massachusetts passed a comprehensive right to repair bill in 2013. It required that manufacturers allow independent mechanics access to the same diagnostic and repair information provided to franchised dealerships. Similar issues have arisen around repairs for other complex technologies such as medical and agricultural equipment, for which 11 states have introduced legislation creating a general right to repair.

But consumer tech, such as smartphones, raises the issue of security to a new level. Opening any device to repair by third parties increases its vulnerability to unauthorized, unwanted software such as malware or spyware. It also gives third-parties access to sensitive user data which, without proper vetting of the third party, may put consumers at risk. Things like phones, tablets, and laptops store an enormous amount of personal data, and by ensuring third parties can access devices, backdoor security risks are inevitable.

Device makers have legitimate concerns about brand integrity and proprietary information. Consumers may blame manufacturers if unauthorized repairs damage products in ways that may not be immediately obvious, either because of software issues or incorrect assembly. In these cases, there is also the risk that any third party looking to get into the repair business will have access to technology and potential trade secrets, which would otherwise be the property of the manufacturer.

In an attempt to balance the benefits of third-party repair with potential business and consumer harms, New York has passed the Digital Fair Repair Act, which will go into effect this summer. A sort of compromise legislation, the New York approach will require manufacturers to provide manuals and parts to both consumers and independent repair providers, but with a few significant limitations.

Notably, the bill does not require any sort of backdoor access to bypass locks on a device. This provision ensures that third parties, and even consumers themselves, will be able to make repairs, but does not give up control entirely in a way that compromises the basic level of data security offered by the device. The bill also shields the original manufacturer from legal liability for damages to a product by a third-party during repair, while allowing the manufacturer to supply assemblies of parts rather than individual pieces.

Nonetheless, state efforts to address repairs for consumer tech goods point to the larger question of the need for right to repair legislation at the federal level. As is true in most cases which impact national industry, a national framework would be better than a patchwork of state legislation. However, as we observe the impacts of the legislation in New York, careful consideration must be given to the ways in which consumers may be harmed by regulatory action. It also must be considered how these fit into existing competition law with regard to aftermarkets, and the impacts to businesses outside of the consumer tech space.

Though the momentum currently lies in the states, Congress will ultimately have to act to create a national standard for right to repair. In the meantime, states should heed New York’s example and ensure any bill has the safety provisions necessary to ensure consumer protections, in contrast with bills currently moving in states like Washington and Minnesota, which both take a looser approach to repair where third parties are allowed more full access to devices for repair. Until Congress is ready to address this issue for both consumer tech products and other high-tech devices, states should take a cautious approach to legislation that will impact the national market.

 

 

 

 

PPI Statement on President Biden’s FY 2024 Budget Proposal

Ben Ritz, Director of the Progressive Policy Institute’s Center for Funding America’s Future, released the following statement on President Biden’s new budget proposal:

“With inflation still running high and the national debt on track to break its historical record as a share of economic output three years sooner than projected last year, both parties should be working together to improve our nation’s finances. We thus applaud President Biden’s decision to call for nearly $3 trillion of deficit reduction over the next decade in his Fiscal Year 2024 budget proposal to Congress — a target that’s three times as ambitious as the one he set in his proposal last year.

“However, we are concerned that this budget does not really tackle the financial challenges facing Social Security and Medicare. The budget’s proposed reforms are largely limited to improving the solvency of Medicare Part A Hospital Insurance, which only finances about 40% of Medicare spending. They do so in part by diverting savings from the other components of Medicare, such as Part D prescription drug benefits, thereby making the broader budget’s financial problems harder to solve. And the proposal makes no meaningful attempt to improve the solvency of Social Security, which faces automatic benefit cuts of over 20% when its trust funds are exhausted in roughly a decade.

“If the president’s preferred approach — one on which he hasn’t even had to try to compromise with Republicans yet — can only close part of the projected funding shortfall for 40% of the smaller of our two biggest underfunded entitlement programs, that’s a clear sign more options must be put on the table. To strengthen the foundation of American retirement security and put our budget on a more sustainable trajectory, we urge the president to reconsider his blanket opposition to benefit reforms and tax increases that may hit some folks earning under $400,000 per year.

“We also challenge House Republicans to counter the president’s proposed budget with their own vision for our fiscal future. If they continue to rule out reasonable revenue increases and heed Donald Trump’s calls to take Social Security and Medicare off the table, Republicans will have no way to produce a plausible plan for reining in the growth of our national debt. Combined with their threats for debt-limit brinkmanship, such an approach would prove the GOP to be far more fiscally irresponsible than the administration.”

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Launched in 2018, PPI’s Center for Funding America’s Future  works to promote a fiscally responsible public investment agenda that fosters robust and inclusive economic growth. We tackle issues of public finance in the United States and offer innovative proposals to strengthen public investments in the foundation of our economy, modernize health and retirement programs to reflect an aging society, and transform our tax code to reward work over wealth.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

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Media Contact: Tommy Kaelin – tkaelin@ppionline.org

Statement from PPI’s Mosaic Project on International Women’s Day

Jasmine Stoughton, Project Director of the Mosaic Project at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), released the following statement in recognition of International Women’s Day:

“For years, women of all backgrounds have been continually underrepresented and unheard. In today’s world, the fight for diversity and equality has never been more important. On International Women’s Day, it’s imperative we recognize the steps we have made, while also keeping in mind the strides that still need to come.

“The Mosaic Project is proud of its work to uplift and promote women from all backgrounds in their respective policy fields. While policy conversations in the past have lacked essential voices, Mosaic is committed to continuing the fight for a seat at a male-dominated table.”

The Mosaic Project is a network of diverse women with expertise in the fields of economics and technology. Mosaic programming aims to bring new voices to the policy arena by connecting cohort members with opportunities to engage with top industry leaders, lawmakers, and the media.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

Follow the Mosaic Project.

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Media Contact: Tommy Kaelin – tkaelin@ppionline.org

An Overview of Global AI Regulation and What’s Next

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the new subject of large-scale regulation by governments around the world. While AI has many benefits, such as increased productivity and cost savings, it also presents some risks and challenges. For example, AI systems can sometimes be biased or discriminatory, leading to unfair outcomes. They can also raise concerns about privacy and data security, as these systems often rely on large amounts of personal data.

As a result, governments around the world are starting to introduce regulations to ensure that AI is developed and used in a safe, responsible, and ethical manner. These regulations cover a range of issues, from data privacy and security to algorithmic transparency and accountability.

This piece will unpack the novel AI regulation in the U.S., EU, Canada, and China and how each country approaches the technology as they seek to balance economic, social, and public priorities with innovation.

European Union: Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA)
The European Union introduced the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) on April 21, 2021. The current text proposes a risk-based approach to guide the use of AI in both the private and public sectors. The approach defines three risk categories: unacceptable risk applications, high-risk applications, and applications not explicitly banned. The regulation prohibits the use of AI in critical services that could threaten livelihoods or encourage destructive behavior but allows the technology to be used in other sensitive sectors, such as health, with maximum safety and efficacy checks by regulators. The legislation is still under review in the European Parliament.

The AI Act is a type of legislation that regulates all automated technology rather than specific areas of concern. It defines AI systems to include a wide range of automated decision-makers, such as algorithms, machine learning tools, and logic tools, even though some of these technologies are not considered AI.

Canada: The Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA)
In June of 2022, Canadian Parliament introduced a draft regulatory framework for Artificial Intelligence using a modified risk-based approach. The bill has three pillars, but this piece will just examine the section dealing with AI, the Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA). The goal of Canada’s AI rules are to standardize private companies’ design and development of AI across the provinces and territories.

The modified risk-based approach is different from the EU’s approach as it does not ban the use of automated decision-making tools, even in critical areas. Instead, under the AIDA regulation, developers must create a mitigation plan to reduce risks and increase transparency when using AI in high-risk systems. The plan should ensure that the tools do not violate anti-discrimination laws. These mitigation plans or impact assessments aim to decrease risk and increase transparency in the use of AI in social, business, and political systems.

United States: AI Bill of Rights and State Initiatives
The United States has yet to pass federal legislation governing AI applications. Instead, the Biden Administration and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have published broad AI guidance for the safe use of AI. In addition, state and city governments are pursuing their own regulations and task forces for AI use. In a break from the EU model, regulation thus far targets specific use cases rather than seeking to regulate AI technology as a whole.

At the federal level, the Biden Administration recently released the AI Bill of Rights, which addresses concerns about AI misuse and provides recommendations for safely using AI tools in both the public and private sectors. This AI strategy would not be legally binding. Instead, the Bill of Rights calls for key safety strategies such as greater data privacy, protections against algorithmic discrimination, and guidance on how to prioritize safe and effective AI tools. While the blueprint is not legally binding, it serves as a guide for lawmakers at all levels of government who are considering AI regulation.

In addition, NIST, which is an agency in the Department of Commerce that develops technology standards, published standards for managing AI bias. NIST also tracks how the public sector integrates AI tools across the federal government.

In 2022, 15 states and localities proposed or passed legislation concerning AI. Some bills focus on regulating AI tools in the private sector, while others set standards for public-sector AI use. New York City introduced one of the first AI laws in the U.S., effective from January 2023, which aims to prevent AI bias in the employment process. Colorado and Vermont created task forces to study AI applications, such as facial recognition, at the state level.

China: Algorithm Transparency and Promoting AI Industry Development
China has set a goal for the private AI industry to make $154 billion annually by 2030. China has yet to pass rules on AI technology at large. Recently, however, the country introduced a law that regulates how private companies use online algorithms for consumer marketing. The law requires companies to inform users of AI for marketing purposes and bans the use of customer financial data to advertise the same product at different prices. However, not surprisingly, the law does not apply to the Chinese government’s use of AI.

Along with China’s federal regulation, in September of 2022, Shanghai became the first province to pass a law focused on private-sector AI development. The law titled Shanghai Regulations on Promoting the Development of the AI Industry provides a framework for companies in the region to develop their AI products in line with non-Chinese AI regulations.

Next Steps for Global Regulation:
Artificial intelligence is a promising tool that is stimulating global growth and driving the future of innovation. Despite the positive impacts of AI, there is no question that some regulation is needed to combat the misuse of AI and to protect consumers.

The different approaches summed in this piece offer methodologies for how policymakers around the world are approaching specific harms from AI, as well as AI as a whole. The EU’s approach regulates the use of any automated decision-making tools and outlines the sectors where they can and cannot be used. The U.S. offers voluntary recommendations and standards at the federal level, with states and cities pursuing their own targeted studies and rules based on specific harms. The modified risk-based approach in Canada regulates all AI tools but stops short of banning the technology in certain spheres by allowing companies to define their own risk-mitigation strategies. And the Chinese approach seeks to increase transparency for consumers and become a global power in AI standards.

To prepare, companies will need to further develop global stances on AI ethics and compliance for their products in order to meet transforming regulations. In addition, legislators should focus on legitimate harms to consumers and keep apprised of how stricter regulatory regimes affect AI innovation.

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: U.S. steel and aluminum output have changed little since 2017

FACT: U.S. steel and aluminum output have changed little since 2017.

THE NUMBERS: Steel production in the United States –

2000                                   102 million tons
2001-2010 average            95 million tons       
2011-2017 average             84 million tons
2017 total                           81.6 million tons
2018-2022 average            83 million tons
2022 total                           82 million tons (first estimate)

 

WHAT THEY MEAN:

A passage from the Commerce Department’s January 2018 “Section 232” report on the national security implications of steel trade argues for a tariff or global quota, on the grounds that this would (a) reduce imports, (b) thus allow U.S. mills to run at 80% capacity instead of the 74% measured in 2017, and so finally (c) secure a U.S. national security need for long-term sources of locally cast metal.  Note in particular the leap of faith in the third sentence: “If a reduction in imports can be combined with an increase in domestic steel demand, as can be reasonably expected …”:

“By reducing import penetration rates to approximately 21 percent, U.S. industry would be able to operate at 80 percent of their capacity utilization. Achieving this level of capacity utilization based on the projected 2017 import levels will require reducing imports from 36 million metric tons to about 23 million metric tons. If a reduction in imports can be combined with an increase in domestic steel demand, as can be reasonably expected [with] rising economic growth rates combined with the increased military spending and infrastructure proposals that the Trump Administration has planned, then U.S. steel mills can be expected to reach a capacity utilization level of 80 percent or greater. This increase in U.S. capacity utilization will enable U.S. steel mills to increase operations significantly in the short-term and improve the financial viability of the industry over the long-term.”

The Department eventually recommended a 25% tariff on most imported steel, and a similar 10% tariff on most imported aluminum, and received these in March 2018. The tariffs are mostly still in place (along with intense controversies between the U.S. and its allies, and at the WTO), though modified by Biden administration agreements with the U.K., EU, and Japan for duty-free imports up to a particular annual quota level.

How do the results look five years later, when compared with the report’s 2018 predictions? Useful figures come from the U.S. Geological Survey, which each year produces concise 2-page reports on mining, smelting, proven reserves, shares of world production, and other stats for 138 metals and minerals, from abrasives and aggregates to yttrium and zirconium, with salt, talc, tin, crushed rocks, gemstones, gold, rare earth elements, platinum group metals, steel, and aluminum in between. This year’s steel section, out January 31, reports the following:

(1) Output: U.S. raw steel production, at 82 million tons in 2022, was about the same as the 81.6 million tons in pre-tariff 2017, after ticking up to 87.8 million tons in 2019 and then dropped during and since the COVID pandemic. The total is more or less the same as the average output over the last decade or in the five pre-232 years.

(2) Capacity utilization: The Federal Reserve’s “FRED” database reports U.S. steel capacity utilization at 72.6% in December 2022, slightly below the 74.0% reported in December 2017. Full-year average figures were 73.5% in 2017 and 74.7% in 2022.

(3) Domestic demand: USGS’ calculates U.S. ‘apparent consumption’ of steel at 96 million tons in 2022, down a bit from 99 million tons in 2017. The 2022 figure is essentially equal to the 2007-2017 average of 95.5 million tons per year (and far below the 104 million-ton average from 1996-2006).

By these measures, the U.S. steel industry looks about the same in 2022 as it did in 2017. Thus the Commerce Department’s prediction that growth plus public policy would create “an increase in domestic demand” for steel, and long-term higher capacity utilization despite the higher prices tariffs would create, didn’t pan out. Two other measures, though, do show some changes:

(4) Trade: U.S. imports of steel were 30 million tons in 2022, well below the 42.4 million tons reported for 2017 and slightly below the 32 million-ton average from 2008 to 2017. U.S. steel exports are also down, though, from 9.6 million tons in 2017 to 8.0 million tons. In effect, since the tariffs U.S. producers have gained some market share within the United States, but lost a bit worldwide.

(5) Employment: USGS finds blast furnaces and steel mill employment down from 80,600 in 2017 to 75,000 in 2022, and foundry employment from 65,000 to 50,000. (More recent Bureau of Labor Statistics shows smaller declines, from 82,000 to 80,000 in mills and from 117,000 to 108,000 in foundries.) Either way, this isn’t a great industrial measure, since lower employment with identical output can easily reflect investment in technologies and higher productivity.

The aluminum story seems pretty similar. USGS’ aluminum survey reports 741,000 tons of primary aluminum output in 2017, rising to 1.09 million tons in 2019 and then falling back to 860,000 tons in 2022. As with steel, 2022 aluminum imports and exports were both below their 2017 levels, with imports down from 6.2 million tons in 2017 to 5.9 million tons in 2022, and exports from 1.3 million tons to 1.0 million tons. Their figure for aluminum import market share has oscillated more violently than that for steel, having risen from 33% in 2014 to 59% in pre-tariff 2017, falling to 38% in 2020 during the COVID pandemic and 41% in 2021, and then jumping back up to 54% in 2022.

In sum, imports of both metals did in fact drop after the tariffs; but the Commerce Department’s anticipation of higher output and higher capacity utilization rates didn’t materialize, and its expectation that tariffs would be consistent with rising domestic use of these metals looks a bit optimistic.

 

FURTHER READING:

The “Section 232” site for the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, with links to the 2018 reports on steel and aluminum.

… or direct to the 2018 steel report.

… and direct to the 2018 aluminum report.

FRED (“Federal Reserve Economic Data”) has steel capacity utilization trends back to 1970.

The U.S. Geological Survey’s mineral commodity statistics, covering 132 substantives from abrasives, aggregates, and aluminum to yttrium and zirconium, with salt, pumice through steel, aluminum, rare earth elements, cement, gold, iridium/osmium/platinum, gemstones, tin, and more in between.

 

 

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

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PPI Announces Hiring of Sam Knapke as New Congressional Policy Fellow, Supporting the New Democrat Coalition

Today, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) announced Sam Knapke has been hired as its new Congressional Policy Fellow to be placed in the office of the New Democrat Coalition (NDC). This fellowship program is designed to support the NDC’s policy staff as they craft pragmatic policy solutions to address the nation’s toughest challenges.

“I am beyond excited to partner with PPI and join the New Dem team. Working to advance the legislative priorities of communities across the country has long been a career goal of mine and I look forward to enhancing the coalition’s policy staff,” said Sam Knapke.

PPI’s Congressional Fellowship program provides fellows with a unique opportunity to gain valuable Capitol Hill experience and learn more about the legislative process by working within the NDC. As a Policy Fellow, Knapke will report directly to NDC staff and support its legislative team by analyzing legislative issues and proposals, developing and coordinating staff and Member briefings, and managing NDC and stakeholder relationships.

Knapke is currently finishing up his master’s degree in International Affairs from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Knapke comes to PPI with experience working in the State Department and the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

As one of the largest ideological caucuses in the House of Representatives, the New Democrat Coalition is solutions oriented caucus seeking to bridge the gap between left and right by challenging outmoded partisan approaches to governing. Its Members are committed to pro-economic growth, pro-innovation, and fiscally responsible policies. Learn more about the NDC and its members by visiting newdemocratcoalition.house.gov.

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Media Contact: Tommy Kaelin; tkaelin@ppionline.org