FACT: Polling: U.S. public is against Trump tariffs by about 60%-36%.

THE NUMBERS: Negative/positive* views of Trump administration tariffs in recent polls –

* Topline averages across all respondents. Polling questions differ slightly: Pew, Fox, NBC, NPR/Marist, and Washington Post/ABC ask whether respondents “approve” or “disapprove” of Mr. Trump’s handling of tariffs. CNN asks whether respondents view the tariff increases as “good policy” or “bad policy,” NYT/Siena whether respondents “support” or “oppose” the tariff increases, and Economist/YouGov about whether tariffs will hurt or help the U.S. economy. 

WHAT THEY MEAN:

The Tariff Act of 1930, nicknamed “Smoot-Hawley” for the Congressional authors Reed Smoot and Willis Hawley, passed in June,  during the second year of the Herbert Hoover presidency.  The oldest living American — Pennsylvanian Naomi Whitehead, planning for her 115th birthday this fall — was then nineteen. A few thousand more Americans aged 105 years and above join her with personal memories of the event. No one else remembers a general U.S. tariff increase —​​ so for the other 337 million Americans, the experience is new.

Ms. Whitehead’s “greatest generation” concluded in the early 1930s that tariff increases had been a bad idea, and their decision guided policy for the next 80 years. What are the other 337 million 21st-century Americans thinking now, as they monitor administration tariff decrees and revisions, assess its various slogans — “new golden age,” “Production Society,” “Liberation Day,” “two dolls are enough for a girl,” “WalMart should eat the tariffs” — and look for local price and employment impacts? A stream of major media April polls provides an interim snapshot as their opinions form:

The polls — CNN/SSRS, Fox News, Washington Post/ABC News, New York Times/Siena, Pew Center, NBC News, NPR/Marist, Economist/YouGov — suggest three areas of broad consensus: high awareness of the tariff increases; an overall negative view of them; and alarm about the cost of living. The “crosstabs” and “internals,” meanwhile, suggest convergence among some groups whose views on trade policy have differed in previous 21st-century polls — college and non-college, urban and rural, high- and low-income — and apparently widening opinion gaps by race and ethnicity, and by political affiliation. A summary:

Consensus 1: Wide Opposition to Tariff Increases. Averaging the polls, about 60% of the public is negative about the Trump administration’s tariff increases, and 36% is positive. Results vary a bit by poll, but not drastically: the Washington Post/ABC’s 64%-33% split is the most negative response, and the New York Times/Siena 55%-40% division least.

Consensus 2: Prices and Cost of Living are a Top Concern. The polls likewise agree on the high priority the public currently places on prices and cost of living. In CNN/SSRS, for example, 58% of respondents cite cost as the “biggest economic problem facing [my] family,” and 9% mention tariffs specifically. NBC News likewise, asking respondents which economic problem they consider most serious, finds 44% citing “inflation and the cost of living,” while “taxes and take-home pay” and “jobs and unemployment” trail behind at 10% and 7%. Economist/YouGov has an additional insight: asking whether tariffs will help or hurt the U.S. economy in general, and then the respondent’s own personal finances, they get a 53%-30% hurt/help judgment for the national economy, and a sharper 53%-16% divide on personal finance. And a different sort of survey, last Friday’s University of Michigan consumer confidence report, shows very high awareness of tariffs and their link to price increases:

“Tariffs were spontaneously mentioned by nearly three-quarters of consumers, up from almost 60% in April; uncertainty over trade policy continues to dominate consumers’ thinking about the economy.”

Narrowing Gap: Education. Earlier 21st-century polling typically found college-educated Americans more “pro-trade” and high-school diploma holders less. The gap remains in these polls, but has narrowed as non-college Americans (especially African Americans and Hispanic) shift toward a more negative view of tariffs. NPR/Marist’s college-educated Americans, for example, disapprove of Trump’s handling of tariffs by 67% to 32%, and their non-college respondents agree by a somewhat smaller 57% to 43%. In CNN/SSRS likewise, college-educated Americans consider the tariffs “bad policy” by 64-23% and non-college by a smaller 50%-30% margin.

Widening Gap: Race and Ethnicity. On the other hand, past polls rarely showed wide racial and ethnic differences on trade (though Hispanic and Asian Americans at times seemed more “pro-trade” than white and African American respondents). In April’s polls, white respondents are somewhat less negative about Trump administration tariffs than other Americans (though majorities still oppose), and African American opinion is intensely critical. Fox News, for example, has white respondents opposing 56%-35%, African Americans 71%-21%, and Hispanics 60%-31%. Washington Post/ABC likewise finds white Americans disapproving 56%-42%, African Americans 86%-13%, and Hispanics 72%-26%. New York Times/Siena is the outlier, with white respondents opposing by only a small 49%-46% plurality, while African Americans oppose by 75%-16%, Hispanics by 61%-28%, and “other” (presumably combining Native American and Asian American opinion) by 61%-31%.

Widening Gap: Political. The partisan divide in these polls, on the other hand, is much wider than before. Previous 21st-century trade polls did usually find Democrats and liberals more “positive” about trade than Republicans and conservatives — i.e., either more likely to support trade liberalizing agreements and WTO rules, or more negative about tariffs and protectionism — but the April polls report much larger gaps. Democrats oppose the Trump administration’s tariffs overwhelmingly and in some polls almost unanimously, while Republicans favor them by somewhat smaller margins. Political independents are much closer to Democrats. A four-poll comparison:

• Washington Post/ABC:  Democrats “disapprove” of Mr. Trump’s tariffs by 96% to 4% and independents by 70%-28%, while Republicans “approve” by a 74% to 25% margin. Also note: 83% of Republicans “approve” of Mr. Trump’s policies overall and 15% “disapprove,” suggesting less enthusiasm for the tariffs than for other administration policies.
• NPR/Marist: Democrats disapprove 90% to 7% and independents 64%-28%; Republicans approve by 73% to 20%.
• Fox News: Democrats disapprove 88%-7%, and independents 73%-19%: Republicans approve 63%-23%.
• CNN/SRS: Democrats consider the tariffs “bad policy” by 90%-3% and independents 58%-18%; Republicans “good policy” by 64%-16%.

So: As to whether this generation of Americans will draw the same conclusions that Ms. Whitehead’s reached in the 1930s, it’s still probably too early to tell. Democrats do seem to have made up their minds, but more general opinion may not set hard until late summer or fall. But as people ponder the first general tariff increase since the Hoover era, and watch its price, employment, and other local impacts, polling does make two things pretty clear: (1) the initial judgment is quite negative, and (2) with the administration’s “new golden age,” “production society,” and “Liberation Day” rhetoric having failed, its ‘window’ to shape opinion may soon close.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

FACT: The U.S. trade deficit has nearly doubled this year.

THE NUMBERS: U.S. trade deficit (goods and services combined) –

* Census, May 2025 FT-900 release
** BEA, advance GDP estimate for the first quarter of 2025

WHAT THEY MEAN:

In an exchange with Rep. Brendan Boyle (D-Pa.) at an April House Ways and Means Committee hearing (2:20:43), U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer defines “success” for the Trump administration’s tariff decrees as follows:

“The deficit [i.e. trade balance] needs to go in the right direction. Manufacturing as a share of GDP needs to go in the right direction.” 

Economics and daily life offer lots of reasons to object to this.  “Manufacturing as a share of GDP,” for example, would fall during a factory boom if (say) homebuilding, digital tech firms, and retail sales grew even faster. Likewise, in a recession, the manufacturing share of GDP could rise even if Americans made many fewer cars, dental drills, harvesters, semiconductor chips, etc., so long as housing and finance crashed harder.  Trade balances, meanwhile, can provide insights on the economy, but their relationship to economic trends is often perverse: deficits tend to rise during good years and fall in recessions. And most people likely see a lower cost of living, strong growth, and job opportunities as the main indications of successful policy, whether in trade specifically or economics in general.

But shelving these high-minded arguments for a minute, how do Ambassador Greer’s two indexes look so far?

We don’t yet know about the “manufacturing share of GDP” and won’t for a while. The Bureau of Economic Analysis does these estimates every three months. Their first 2025 “GDP by Industry” release doesn’t come out until June 26th, and it covers January to March; the first data for trends since the April 2 won’t be out until late September. For the trade balance, though, the initial numbers are drifting in, and they’re pretty unappealing.

Trade-balance numbers originate in data on cargo manifests, pipeline computers, air cargo package arrivals, etc. Customs and Border Protection officers dutifully convey them to Census statisticians who collate and analyze the raw data, add in estimates of service flows, and publish the numbers every month.  Their most recent release — last Thursday’s “FT-900”, covering trade flows in March — suggests that the prospect of rising tariff rates, then the February/March tariff decrees, and the prospect of more in April, induced a rapid and massive deficit spike.

This release reports an overall U.S. March ‘trade deficit’ of $140.5 billion (for goods and services combined) — nearly double the $78.7 billion deficit of October 2024, and more than double the $68.5 billion in March 2024.  Some monthly comparisons across “sectors”:

Alternatively, the broader goods-and-services figures drawn from BEA’s GDP estimates (and still subject to some revision) show quarterly “deficits” in a $200 to $250 billion range last year, or just under 3% of GDP. The first quarter of 2025 brought a sudden escalation to nearly $400 billion, or 4.2% of GDP. This is the highest GDP ratio BEA has found in 17 years, since the pre-crisis autumn of 2008.

The obvious questions: Why is this happening? How much credit do the administration’s tariff decrees get for it?  Is the spike permanent? And if it is, what would the administration then do?   A few thoughts:

1. Why? “Trade balance” is not an independent thing, but an arithmetical calculation: exports minus imports. The January-March deficit spike is entirely because the ‘import’ side of this calculation got a lot bigger while exports stayed about the same.  The likely cause is that over these months, U.S.-based manufacturers, farmers, and construction firms were stockpiling as much metal, tools, fertilizer, paint, wiring, semiconductor chips, and other inputs as they could to save money before tariffs raised their costs, and retailers were doing the same for spring and summer inventory. So in an immediate sense, the Trump administration’s tariff decrees pretty certainly caused the spike.

2. Is it permanent? Census’ next report will likely still show some import-booming, but over the summer, imports will probably drop back. So all else equal, the deficit would be smaller later in the year.  But by then two new factors will probably come into play, one pushing deficits down and the other pushing them up. They are:

(a) A recession would cut trade deficits: If the U.S. is in recession by July, Americans will buy fewer cars, houses, and consumer goods. Factory slowdowns and canceled construction projects will likewise cut imports of industrial goods.  As in past recessions — 1991, 2001, 2008 — trade deficits would then likely drop. The administration might take solace in that, though the public probably wouldn’t.

(b) Deteriorating savings/investment balance will raise them: Meanwhile, though, the Trump administration’s domestic goals, if met, will lead to higher long-term trade deficits.  The fundamental nature of trade balances is not ‘the incremental results of trade policy here and abroad’, in which balances by country are separate and unconnected data points.  Rather, the trade balance is a core GDP ‘identity’: whether surplus or deficit, it will always equal any gap between national savings and national investment.  If Congress’ potential tax cut is larger than the administration’s tariff increases, government “dissaving” — i.e. the fiscal deficit — will rise. Unless this is offset by some unexpected surge in family savings, or a collapse in business investment, the trade deficit will then grow rather than shrink. This is exactly what happened after the first Trump term’s combination of tariffs on steel, aluminum, and most Chinese-made goods with an income tax cut.

3. And so? The early data look awkward for the trade-balance measurement of success the administration’s senior officials favor. This is probably temporary, but the mix of tariffs and tax policy makes higher long-term deficits more likely than smaller ones. As to the “manufacturing share of GDP,” no particular reason for optimism there either.  Since the first Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese goods, steel, and aluminum in 2018, this share has fallen from 10.9% to 9.9% — either regardless of the tariffs, or in part because of them, given that they raised U.S. manufacturing costs. More of this is probably coming, given the Commerce Department’s apparent plans to make factory managers pay 25% more for basic manufacturing inputs including metals, semiconductor chips, and critical minerals, and the April 2 decree’s 10% tariffs on raw materials, wiring, paint, glass, light-bulbs, ceramics, etc. So there’s a high chance that the administration’s policy will drive both of its chosen “success” indicators — as well as better indicators such as the cost of living — in the “wrong” direction, not the “right” one. What does it then do?

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

Ambassador Greer at the hearing, with prepared text and full video. An exchange with Rep. Boyle on “success” as defined by trade balance and manufacturing GDP share at 2:20:43.

Data:

Census’ most recent monthly FT-900 trade release, with exports, imports, and balances generally, by product type, and by country.

… the FT-900 archives back to 1991.
… and a one-page summary of U.S. imports, exports, and trade balances from 1960 to 2024.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ data on quarterly and annual GDP estimates, along with its GDP by Industry calculations, services trade, investment flows, and more.

Farm trade figures from USDA’s Global Agricultural Trade System.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

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